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Tabor Lecture
LAWYER CRIMES: BEYOND THE LAW?
Charles W. Wolfram1
I. INTRODUCTION
Can lawyers commit crimes while engaged in the traditional practice
of law? Or are lawyers, solely by virtue of their office, beyond the law?
Short of such full immunity, are there situations in which lawyers while
they are functioning as such are - and should be - treated differently,
more leniently, by the criminal law? From a very different perspective,
is there underway in some parts of the United States - as some criminal
defense lawyers and organizations have periodically claimed - a
prosecutor-led effort to weaken the criminal defense bar through
criminal prosecution of some of its members?2 From a theoretical point
of view, one cannot eliminate that possibility as well as the broader,
more general threat that the independence of the legal profession could
be compromised by the threat of criminal prosecution of lawyers for
doing what they do. Does the law allow such injustice? Would courts
tolerate it?
I consider here not so much everyday "street" crimes committed by
lawyers - murder, robbery, rape - although such offenses will be of
secondary interest,3 but most importantly of alleged crimes committed
by lawyers in the course of their professional employment and while
engaged in activities that traditionally have comprised the practice of
law. Take, for example, a lawyer, who, as advocate on behalf of a client,
I Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School. This article is a
revised version of Professor Wolfram's Tabor Lecture, presented at Valparaiso University
Law School April 20,2001.
2 For a recent airing of such general charges, see, e.g., David E. Rovella, Putting Defenders on
the Defensive: The Criminal Defense Bar Says the DOI Is Treating Some Lawyers in Drug Cases
Like Criminals, NAT'L L. J., April 2, 2001, at Al, col. 1 (reporting guilty plea of Miami
criminal defense lawyer Donald Ferguson, former head of the ABA's Criminal Justice
Section and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, to felony count of
money laundering for taking fees from funds known to be the proceeds of illegal drug
conspiracy and reporting worries by criminal defense lawyers about prosecutorial
overreaching).
See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
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is taking the testimony of a favorable witness in the course of a trial
through the customary process of questions and answers. As the lawyer
knows, the favorable witness is providing testimony that, although
apparently credible and quite advantageous for the client, is also false. Is
that lawyer professionally so positioned as to be, in effect, immune from
prosecution for the crime of suborning perjury or obstructing justice, if
the lawyer should continue to elicit the known false testimony and then
argue that the fact finder should accept it as true? Differently, suppose
that the lawyer is representing a person who has been arrested, but not
yet charged. The lawyer knows that another person has been called to
testify before a grand jury, that the prospective witness is unrepresented
by counsel, and that the person has a basis for invoking the Fifth
Amendment. May the lawyer advise the third person to "take the
Fifth"?4 Or, take an office lawyer assisting a business client who wishes
to purchase a business, on credit. The client wants the lawyer to
incorporate into the transaction papers certain documents reflecting that
the client's financial condition is sound. However, the lawyer knows the
documents to be materially false and misleading, and the lawyer also
knows that the selling party will rely on those false statements to its
detriment. Assuming that the transaction continues and the seller is
defrauded, is that lawyer professionally so positioned as to be immune
from prosecution for the crime of aiding and abetting fraud?s Again,
suppose that the lawyer in question, in a criminal-defense practice,
accepts as her fee funds that the lawyer knows to be the proceeds of the
client's business of illegally importing drugs.6 Is the lawyer in violation
4See iifra notes 75-79 and accompanying text; see also State v. Carrasco, 33 P.3d 791 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2001) (reinstating jury verdict of guilty of offense of obstruction of criminal
investigation on proof that criminal defense lawyer representing client accused of sexually
abusing minor stepdaughters falsely stated to worker at home for sheltered children that
lawyer representing children and, in ensuing phone conversation, advised minor victim
that she need not talk to police); People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982) (affirming
conviction of lawyer who drafted agreement for client to receive money in return for being
unavailable to testify at another's criminal trial).
5 Cf., e.g., United States v. Feaster, No. 87-1340, 1988 WL 33814 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 1988)
(affirming multi-count conviction for aiding undercover federal agent in preparing false tax
return).
6 See People v. Zellinger, 504 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1972) (affirming lawyer's conviction of
receiving stolen property where lawyer received car in payment of fee under suspicious
circumstances and failed to make further inquiry). The question of fees paid with the
proceeds of crime has quieted down considerably after initial challenges to an IRS
regulation requiring that lawyers report all large cash payments, identifying the payors,
were uniformly rebuffed in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874
(8th Cir. 1995) (upholding IRS "Form 8300" requiring report of all cash payments - here to
criminal-defense lawyers - in excess of $10,000 under federal money-laundering
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2001], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss1/2
20011 LAWYER CRIMES
of the federal money-laundering statute? If the lawyer advises a client to
destroy incriminating documents if a proceeding is initiated in which
they might be sought, is the lawyer guilty of the offense of obstruction of
justice.r
Lawyers functioning in good faith in these and similar situations
would, of course, wish the answer to be negative. But, unfortunately, so
would the lawyers functioning in bad faith. Surely, the professional and
personal lives of lawyers would be far simpler and less stressful were it
the case that the law shrouded all lawyers' conduct in the course of
professional work with immunity from criminal prosecution. Such an
immunity would still any concern that over-zealous prosecutors were
using the criminal law to chill legitimate zeal on the part of their
customary adversaries and other lawyers. But, just as surely, high social
costs would be imposed on a society in which masses of lawyers - now
likely exceeding a million throughout the country8 - are enabled to
commit, with impunity, what for other professions or persons would be
crimes, or to assist their clients to do so. As we will see, the hard
questions that our subject presents involve essentially an effort to reach a
suitable accommodation of those conflicting social interests.
Lawyers and judges, as well as bar disciplinary officials, presumably
have a less personal objective with respect to my central questions - the
wish to know the answer to them, somewhat without regard to what it
might be. Thoughtful prosecutors, I suspect, have on occasion also
pondered the issue of borderline lawyer criminality with some pangs of
doubt. Members of the public, many of whom undoubtedly would be
shocked to learn that some lawyers believe they have an occupational
immunity from criminal prosecution, would doubtless also like to know
the answer. Yet, after researching as diligently as one might in the law of
legislation); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868
(1994) (upholding Internal Revenue Service summons).
7 Cf United States v. Peristein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942) (affirming conviction of
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct when some overt acts occurred after
empaneling of grand jury). On stronger facts, lawyers have been convicted of obstruction
for personally destroying evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d 20 (6th
Cir. 1981).
' See, e.g., WALT BACHMAN, LAW V. LIFE: WHAT LAWYERS ARE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 93 (1995) ("We now have more than 800,000 American lawyers, up from
200,000 in 1970. By the turn of the century, we are expected to surpass the one million
mark."); Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little
Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 990 (1998) (citing 1994 ABA survey for statement that
number of American lawyers tripled over preceding three decades and in 1998 approached
900,000).
Wolfram: Lawyer Crimes:  Beyond the Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
76 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
virtually every American jurisdiction, including research into the body
of federal decisions (which, as we will see, plays - by default - a central
role in delineating the subject of lawyer crimes), one is left with, at best,
only imperfect answers with rather significant areas of doubt about such
fundamental questions. It is that set of questions that I wish to explore
here.9
My thesis, ultimately, is that lawyers should enjoy no general
immunity from the reach of the criminal law, including for lawyer
activities in the course of law practice. But, I will just as strenuously
insist that a lawyer's proper role in traditional law practice situations
should be taken carefully into account in assessing criminality. How that
should be done is the rub. I will emphasize the fairly uncontroversial
point that a trial court presiding over the criminal trial of a lawyer
accused of wrongdoing in the course of representing a client should take
certain procedural steps to guard against possible prosecutorial misuse
of the criminal law and against criminalizing socially desirable and
professionally accepted lawyer conduct. I will also offer suggestions for
reorganizing the process of making relevant charging decisions against
practicing lawyers within prosecutorial offices. In that respect, it is
somewhat reassuring that the federal Department of Justice has recently
gone part way to put in place such an appropriate review process. 10 But,
it has not gone far enough. Substantively, I will also urge that a little-
noticed provision of the federal witness-tampering criminal statute be
generalized with respect to all lawyers crimes - in effect, placing on the
prosecution the burden of proving that the conduct of the lawyer-
defendant in every such case was insupportable as a proper exercise of
the lawyer's function.
Even if all the recommended precautions were instituted, one must
admit at the end of the day that there is an inevitable and irreducible
occupational risk surrounding some areas of law practice. That risk - the
nature of which will become clearer as we proceed - will continue to
make lawyering in those areas more vulnerable to prosecution. To an
extent, such an additional exposure must accordingly be considered a
heavy but necessary cost of doing that sort of legal business. The
alternative of de-criminalizing all lawyer activity within that realm is
simply socially unacceptable.
9 My exploration is not the first. That entitlement clearly belongs to Professor Bruce Green.
See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327 (1998).
10 See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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Before going further, it would be well to disclose the source of my
interest in the subject of lawyer criminality. At a general level, the
subject is one that has intrigued me for well over two decades, inspired
first by the spectacle of twenty-nine lawyer/ political operatives in the
Nixon administration who were convicted of felonies or suffered other
remedies as the direct result of Watergate in the middle 1970s. 1 At least
some of those lawyers were convicted of crimes for activities in the
course of what could be described as otherwise traditional lawyer roles.
A second, more proximate stimulus was the work involved in drafting
and debating what became Section 8 of the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers - a section that outlines the
present state of the law in the United States with respect to lawyer
susceptibility to criminal prosecution. 12 At least by implication, the
Restatement makes the major substantive point here: that, in general,
lawyers are subject to the criminal law in much the same way as are non-
lawyers, although I now see that our approach is insufficiently subtle
and complex.
Third, I have been involved in recent years as an expert witness in
lawyer litigation. In one criminal prosecution of a lawyer for
representation-related crimes, I testified for the defense side. More
recently, I served as an advisor to a federal prosecutor but in the event
was not designated or called as an expert. Because I feel in the
circumstances that I should protect the identities of the lawyer-
defendants - which federal-court juries found, respectively, guilty and
innocent - I identify neither case here. Neither, as far as I have been able
to discover, has resulted in a publicly reported decision. The outcome of
the first case illustrates, and not for the first time, the modest
contribution of legal-ethics experts13 in the trial of what are, at bottom,
intensely fact-driven controversies.14 (Or perhaps, more personally, its
outcome is a comment mainly on my own work as an expert witness.)
Fourth, my early ruminations about writing on this subject were
interrupted in the deflating way that occurs, unless one is lucky or quick.
In this instance, that occurred when an excellent article directly on point
11 See N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related CIarges Against Twenty-nine Lawyers, 62
A.B.A. J. 1337 (1976) (reporting on release of study by the Special Committee on
Coordination of Watergate Discipline of National Organization of Bar Counsel, that 27
lawyers were named as defendants or unindicted co-conspirators in criminal proceedings
arising out of Watergate and 2 others were the subject of public bar discipline).
12 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 8 (2000) (hereinafter "RESTATEMENT").
' 
3 See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
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was published by Professor Bruce A. Green of Fordham.' 5 I hold Bruce
Green and his work in high regard and once again learned much in
studying his article, but I nonetheless found that his analysis and mine
differ at certain important points, particularly on the core question of
defining the criminal liability of lawyers. While I will not hereafter again
refer explicitly to Professor Green's excellent article, a reader of the
published version of this Tabor Lecture following along through the
footnotes will recognize the debt that I, and we all, owe to his
groundbreaking article.
One final word: most of the reported decisions - and there are not
many - deal with lawyer crimes committed in the course of conducting a
criminal-defense practice. There are, of course, similar questions that
must be raised about civil litigation as well, and there are a few decisions
on point. Within recent years, for example, the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Gellenel6 captured the rapt attention of the bankruptcy bar when
it affirmed the criminal conviction of a bankruptcy lawyer who was a
partner in a major New York City law firm for failing to make proper
disclosure of a conflict of interest in a civil bankruptcy filing. Moreover,
there are perhaps even more questions that might be raised about non-
litigation work by lawyers - transactional or office practice. And,
indeed, some of the decisions on lawyer crime have involved such office
work, such as the well-known decision of Judge Friendly in United States
v. Benjamin,17 affirming the conviction of a lawyer, as well as an
accountant, for their involvement in a securities scam, and in the process
writing one of the most well-known opinions on the criminal law
concept of knowledge through conscious avoidance of readily available
facts. Nonetheless, despite occasionally examining decisions involving
lawyer crime in contexts other than criminal defense, I will focus here
mainly on that limited realm of practice. I do so in the interests both of
brevity and because, as I will later stress, the context in which criminal
defense lawyers work is terribly important.18 To skitter continually over
disparate fields would obscure both necessary analysis and that
elemental point about context.
I5 Green, supra note 9.
16 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming lawyer's conviction of offense of making false
material declaration in bankruptcy proceeding).
17 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
18 See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
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II. LAWYER CRIMES: THE EASY CASES
No matter how nervous one might be about the extent to which the
criminal law might apply to lawyer activities, it would, of course, go
entirely too far for me to leave the impression that anyone has
prominently suggested that lawyers should enjoy a general, occupational
immunity from the criminal law. The arguments, which I address
below,19 urging immunity from criminal liability are much more focused.
I wish, then, to dispose of rather peremptorily a set of situations that I
refer to as the "easy cases" - instances in which the application of
criminal law to lawyers has not seriously been contested. I will then turn
to the much less tractable problems.
There are at least two general areas of lawyer criminal liability that
have been well-established and well-accepted for decades, even
centuries, in American jurisprudence. Despite general agreement about
them, however, there are useful intimations of a general nature that flow
from a brief examination of both. I refer to the first area as the "totally
out-of-role" lawyer crime; the second I will term the "in-role-but-clearly-
wrongful" crime. I will also use the occasion of this discussion to take a
brief collateral tour through the important, and also instructive, area of
lawyer discipline for criminal offenses.
A. Totally-Out-Of-Role Lawyer Crimes
I commence with totally-out-of-role lawyer crimes. I first want to
examine the nature of such crimes and their consequences for lawyer
discipline.
1. The Nature of Totally-Out-of-Role Crimes and Their Consequences
for Lawyer Discipline
Suppose that with malice aforethought (and with whatever
additional bad thoughts and actions the relevant substantive law of
crimes requires), Lawyer takes the life of her husband. She is then
indicted fpr the criminal offense of murder. The media headlines will
almost certainly play on Lawyer's occupation: "Lawyer Murders
Husband!!" I take it that no one would disagree that Lawyer is subject to
the full reach of the criminal law. Many other lawyers will no doubt be
chagrined to varying degrees because of the sharp and unwelcome, but
seemingly inevitable, preoccupation of media coverage with Lawyer's
19 See itfra note 63 and accompanying text.
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occupation in reporting about the murder and the ensuing trial. Such
media sensationalism is, I suppose, intended to suggest that danger lurks
everywhere, even for the well-off and occupationally privileged.
Nonetheless, Lawyer's act had nothing to do with her law practice and
could as well have been committed by a perpetrator pursuing any other
occupation. Hence, it is not surprising that no one has ever thought to
argue that lawyers who commit such totally-out-of-role offenses are in
some way above the usual reach of the criminal law.20 They are not now,
and never have been. Lawyer will surely be tried for murder in much
the same way as would any non-lawyer - at least, any other non-lawyer
of the same socio-economic level - in what are otherwise the same
circumstances.
Should Lawyer be convicted, and even if she were acquitted of all
charges or pardoned after conviction,21 Lawyer can also be charged with
a disciplinary offense under the non-criminal procedures set up in any
jurisdiction in which she is admitted to practice. Given the seriousness
of the offense, such disciplinary procedures will certainly follow, and in
many jurisdictions would precede the criminal trial through a
2 The argument is not as bizarre as it may at first appear. Such an argument, although
today regarded as frivolous in view of the weight of authority, would have proceeded by
considering the plight of a lawyer who is subjected to both lawyer discipline and the
criminal law. Although this sequence is now quite rare, a lawyer who is required to contest
disciplinary charges prior to a criminal prosecution (in the absence of the running of all
relevant statutes of limitation on all possible charges of crime, or except after being granted
broad immunity) faces a Hobbesian choice. She must either testify at the disciplinary
proceeding and thereby face the prospect that her disciplinary testimony will be used
adversely in a possible future criminal prosecution, or she must refuse to testify in
professional self-defense and thereby incur a greater risk of professional discipline because
of possible use of her refusal to testify as an adverse inference. If bar counsel calls the
lawyer to testify in the disciplinary proceeding, a self-incrimination claim is not available in
any satisfactory form. While the lawyer may refuse to testify on that ground, the lawyer's
refusal may be used in the discipline case as evidence of the lawyer's guilt of the charges.
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 5 cmt. g reporter's note, at 61; CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.4.3, at 104-05 (1986) (hereinafter "MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS").
21 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 5 cmt. g (stating that "[a] record of
conviction is conclusive evidence that the lawyer committed the offense, but absence of a
conviction does not preclude a disciplinary prosecution. Because of the different agencies
(prosecutor and lawyer disciplinary counsel) involved in criminal and disciplinary
enforcement and the higher standard of proof in criminal cases, an acquittal does not by
itself preclude a charge for any disciplinary purpose"). See id. reporter's note at 61 (citing
authority). That approach is one of long standing. See, e.g., In re Attorney, 86 N.Y. 563
(N.Y. 1881) (rejecting argument of lawyer that governor's pardon expunged effect of
conviction for lawyer-discipline purposes in reliance on nineteenth century American and
English authority).
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proceeding to impose interim suspension.22 In several ways, criminal
conviction has long been regarded as the proto-typically appropriate
occasion for lawyer discipline. That was reflected, for example, in the
many state statutes both before and after the American Revolution that
listed a lawyer's commission of a serious criminal offenses as a per se
ground for disbarment.2 3 Lawyer crime - at least serious lawyer crime -
was and remains the easy case for lawyer discipline. 24 The situation is
nonetheless historically interesting. In a review of pre-twentieth century
American lawyer-discipline cases that I conducted for a recent inquiry
into the history of legal ethics, 25 I was struck by the very high percentage
of reported lawyer-discipline decisions that resulted from convictions
for just such out-of-role lawyer crimes. 26 It appears, in short, that for a
long time a high percentage of lawyer-discipline prosecutions came only
after - and, one is tempted to speculate in many of those instances,
perhaps mainly because of - prior public conviction of a lawyer for a
crime not connected to legal practice. That does not suggest that
prosecutors were strongly motivated in their prosecutorial work to rid
the bar of miscreants, although that might have supplied some part of
their incentive. It does suggest that, without such prosecutorial efforts,
the level of lawyer-disciplinary enforcement would have been even
lower than the scant numbers that the then system of professional
discipline produced throughout the nineteenth, and much of the
twentieth, century. Beginning in approximately 1970, however, the
2 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 5 cmt. g (stating that "[ilnterim suspension of a
lawyer accused of crime may be warranted and is commonly provided for following
conviction of a serious crime regardless of pendency of an appeal").
23 See, e.g., In re Percy, 36 N.Y. 651, 653 (N.Y. 1867) (describing grounds stated in Section 67
of the N.Y. Code of Civil Procedure for disbarment or suspension of lawyer as including
"any deceit, malpractice, crime or misdemeanor").
24 See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1969) (noting that
lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in criminal conduct involving moral turpitude"); MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (1983) (noting that it is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to
"commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects"). See generally LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT 101:301 (1990) (listing decisions on lawyer crimes as a basis for discipline);
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 20, at § 3.3.2.
2 See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a Histonj of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-I.
Origins, 8 CHI. L. SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 469 (2001).
2 Whether those reported decisions also fairly represent the unknowable number of lawyer
discipline decisions that were not reported is not knowable with certainty. However, it
seems fairly clear that, if anything, the unreported decisions of trial courts that were never
appealed and, hence, reported would likely consist of an even greater percentage of cases
of clear criminal guilt and, hence, clear grounds for discipline. That presumably was
particularly the situation once it became well-established that lawyer discipline based on a
criminal conviction was appropriate.
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levels of lawyer discipline have steadily risen, although surely not to
everyone's satisfaction. Not even the national bar itself has expressed
full satisfaction.27 Discipline for practice-unrelated criminal convictions
remains a significant staple of the disciplinary statistics, if at lower
percentage levels relative to non-criminal professional offenses. It thus
may remain the case that the concern of the bar and courts to push for
lawyer discipline in cases of conviction for a serious crime is motivated
as much or more by a concern with the image of the profession than with
protecting clients and the legal system against lawyers who are
perceived to be fundamentally flawed practitioners. To be sure, it may
also, or instead, reflect the relative inadequacies of the disciplinary
system in attempting to cope with what will often be strongly-contested
charges of criminal conduct. In most instances, prosecutors, assisted as
they are by an established investigative apparatus for detecting and
gathering evidence of crimes, are probably in a superior position to carry
forward a court proceeding against a lawyer for crime. Given their
public funding, prosecutors are probably also better able to launch and
sustain prosecutions in complex cases, as compared to the lawyer
discipline process, which in most states is supported only by exactions
from the legal profession from annual dues, leading to recurring crises of
disciplinary funding.28
2. The Process of Discipline Following a Lawyer's Criminal Conviction
While professional proceedings against lawyers for non-criminal
conduct apparently constitute a larger percentage of lawyer-discipline
proceedings than was true prior to 1970, it remains true that a lawyer's
conviction for crime continues to be treated as a particularly egregious
disciplinary offense, at least under recent articulations of such offenses.29
The serious nature of a criminal conviction for lawyer discipline is
reflected in two things: the inclusive definition of the kinds of criminal
offenses that will subject a lawyer to professional discipline in the lawyer
2 See ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report: Lawyer
Regulation for a New Century 89-129 (1992) (hereinafter "McKay Commission Report")
(assessing in an appendix how state and national bars had responded to specific
recommendations of earlier, highly-critical ABA committee).
Inadequate funding in view of a greatly expanded lawyer population was listed as the
major problem in lawyer discipline in the most recent nationwide review of the
professional disciplinary process by the ABA. See McKay Commission Report, supra note
27, at 69 and following.
29 The necessary database of statistics on lawyer discipline before the 1970s is unavailable
(unless one were to use the crude measure of reported - and thus largely appellate -
decisions). Thus, it is not possible to validate statistically the frequently expressed
impression that non-criminal grounds of discipline now loom larger in most jurisdictions.
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codes, and the procedures for administering discipline to a convicted
lawyer. Under modem lawyer codes, a lawyer is subject to professional
discipline with respect to any "criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer ... ."30 Note,
among other things, that the lawyer codes themselves, as did the
nineteenth-century statutes specifying the grounds for lawyer discipline,
clearly assume that prosecutions of lawyers for crime will routinely
occur. In view of that broad recognition of the potential for such
applications of the criminal law to lawyer conduct, it would be entirely
insupportable to argue for any sort of broad lawyer immunity.
In applying the grounds for discipline stated in the lawyer codes,
many decisions have concluded that lawyer involvement in any serious
criminal activity satisfies the third predictive element by indicating that
the lawyer has a professionally inappropriate attitude toward illegal
conduct.31 The seriousness of lawyer crime is also emphasized in such
procedural features as the rule that a lawyer convicted of a crime is
bound by the strictures of res judicata and cannot protest innocence in a
subsequent discipline case,32 as well as the procedure for interim
suspension of a lawyer pending the outcome of a criminal prosecution
for a serious crime.33 Perhaps most dramatically (certainly for the
30 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 23, at R. 8.4(b). The rule has been widely
copied verbatim in the more than forty jurisdictions that have adopted some version of the
Model Rules. See, e.g., INDIANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.4(b) (2001) (same). The
older, and now largely superseded MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) contained
somewhat comparable language in DR 1-102(A)(3) (lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude"), but seemed to stress more the moral repulsiveness of
the act without attempting textually to connect the criminality of the act with its predictive
elements. See MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 20, at 92-94.
-1" See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882) (upholding disbarment from federal court
of a lawyer who actively participated in the lynching of an accused being tried in same
court, and on tree on court lawn, stating that for a lawyer ".. . of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot, and to ignore the very bands
of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. It manifests a want of fidelity to
the system of lawful government which he has sworn to uphold and preserve"). See
generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 5 cmt. g (stating that "[a]n act constituting a
violation of criminal law is also a disciplinary offense when the act either violates a specific
prohibition in an applicable lawyer code or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer").
32 See McKay Commission Report, supra note 27, at 116-17 (reporting that forty-four of
forty-nine jurisdictions surveyed had rules providing that criminal conviction is conclusive
evidence that the lawyer committed the crime for which convicted, and that the only issue
in the lawyer-discipline proceeding is the nature and extent of discipline to be imposed).
3 See, e.g., In re Brewster, 587 A.3d 1067 (Del. 1991) (permanent disbarment of lawyer
earlier placed on interim suspension after indictment in federal court for bank fraud). The
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individual lawyers involved), the ABA's own standards for imposing
discipline recommend, in accord with the position of most courts, that in
imposing disciplinary sanctions in Such cases, disbarment rather than a
lengthy term of suspension is the appropriate sanction.34 The complaint,
heard twenty years ago from the bar itself,35 that lawyers are routinely
given overly-lenient treatment by prosecutors when apprehended for
criminal offenses is heard less today.36 Instead, the complaint now
persistently heard - at least from lawyers - is that prosecutors have
become overly aggressive in their pursuit of lawyers.3' I have no idea
whether a statistical study (I know of none) would uphold either
concern. My impression, on the whole, is that public expressions of
concern by lawyers about the criminal prosecution of other lawyers may
be more a product of lawyer clubbiness and special pleading than a true
measure of cause for general alarm.
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement apparently contemplate interim
suspension for serious crime only after conviction in the criminal process. ABA MODEL
RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, R. 19(b)(1979). However, the ABA Model
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions also contemplated interim suspension "when the
lawyer poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public." ABA MODEL
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCrIONs, R. § 2.4 (b) (1986). That standard, in turn,
has been criticized as overly restrictive, and the ABA now takes the position that the
standard should be one of "substantial threat of serious harm." See McKay Commission
Report, supra note 27, at 55.
-'See ABA MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, supra note 33, at § 5.11(a)
(stating that disbarment is generally appropriate when "a lawyer engages in serious
criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances;
or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses).
4 ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and
Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 179-80 (1970) (hereinafter "Clark
Committee Report") (reporting a widespread problem of lawyers accused of crime being
given preferential treatment by law-enforcement authorities and courts, by way of overly-
lenient plea bargains and the like).
36 Cf, e.g., McKay Commission Report, supra note 27, at 127-28 (finding no problem similar
to that reported by Clark Committee Report, as discussed supra note 35, and, to the
contrary, concluding that "[tjhe advent of statewide disciplinary agencies with professional
disciplinary counsel and the great increase in disciplinary actions against lawyers have
effectively eliminated the ability of respondents to play prosecutors and disciplinary
counsel against one another" and further finding it "very unlikely today that a prosecutor
would be susceptible to a plea for leniency on the basis that an accused lawyer might lose
his or her license").
37 See supra note 2.




Beyond criminal conviction of a lawyer for offenses having nothing
essentially to do with law practice, there is a second category of
relatively non-controversial criminal prosecutions of lawyers. That
consists of crimes that the lawyer committed in the course of
representing a client, but in which the lawyer's activity was clearly
wrongful. Teasing out the features of this necessarily inexact category
assists in developing an insight about lawyer criminality generally.
Again, this is an area in which lawyer activists and lawyer organizations
- the bodies most likely to make arguments about limiting the
application of criminal law to lawyers - have not contested the
proposition that the same law that applies to non-lawyers should apply
to lawyers as well. At bottom, the instinct that lawyers must surely
accept the criminal-law consequences of clearly wrongful criminal
conduct is based on concern about the injury to persons and society that
immunity would create, and the perception that extending immunity to
such offenses is simply unwarranted by any legitimate need for latitude
arising out of the lawyer's occupational role. In other words, it is
apparently widely accepted that lawyers can function with full
effectiveness without engaging in this category of acts that clearly violate
the criminal law. In addition, as we will see, many of the included
offenses involve crimes directed against the lawyer's own client, a
situation in which it would be difficult to propound a reason for giving
special protection to lawyers. To the contrary, given our typical
assumption about the vulnerability of clients to lawyer over-reaching,
the situation would seem to call for special vigilance in enforcing the
criminal law.
The case reporters contain many such in-role cases.38 Those decisions
are regularly ignored by proponents of the view that lawyers should be
subject to the criminal law in the course of their work only to a limited
degree. One prowling the reporters can unearth a trove of such
decisions. A lawyer in Ohio was recently disciplined after being
convicted for a crime while serving as prosecutor - an unusual instance
of a watchdog being bitten. 39 The charges involved filing a false affidavit
8 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 69-79 (3d ed. 1999)
(offering a useful selection of decisions and a run-through of the most prominent offenses
in the lawyer-crime decisions).
" See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 722
nn.3-4 (2000) (examining the infrequency of professional discipline of prosecutors and
repeated charges by defense lawyers and others that many instances of clear prosecutorial
2001]
Wolfram: Lawyer Crimes:  Beyond the Law
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
86 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
with the court regarding the value of a vehicle in the course of a
prosecution, apparently to enhance the charge or the sentence imposed. 4°
A lawyer in Michigan was subjected to discipline following his
conviction of the crime of assault and battery after he, as the court put it,
"lost it" during a highly contentious deposition, came around the
deposition table, and assaulted the deponent.41 A lawyer in Rhode
Island was recently exonerated of the charged criminal offense of
harboring a criminal, but only because the police had misrepresented to
him that warrants were not outstanding for the arrest of his client.42 The
Second Circuit recently upheld the RICO-conspiracy convictions of two
named partners in a New York City law firm who, as the evidence
showed, had entered into a long-standing arrangement with corrupt
officers of a police pension fund. Under the scheme, the lawyers
received millions of dollars in fees in return for their undertaking to kick
back hundreds of thousands of dollars to the officials.43 In that decision,
and others like it, courts have accepted prosecutor arguments, on
particular facts, that the "enterprise" required for criminal RICO liability
was the law firm itself."
Most properly grouped in this category of in-role-but-clearly-
wrongful cases are situations in which lawyers are convicted and
disbarred after having been found guilty of stealing their clients' funds, 45
or committing similar serious wrongs against their clients.4 Criminal
courts, prosecutors, and bar-disciplinary agencies all seem, quite rightly,
to treat such offenses with special strictness. For example, the United
States Supreme Court recently upheld, unanimously, the mail fraud
conviction of a partner in a large Minneapolis law firm who had traded
misconduct are not made the subject of professional discipline and collecting
commentators making such charges).
4 Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Slack, 725 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio 2000). Lawyer Slack had also been
convicted of multiple felony counts in an unrelated matter. Id. at 632.
41 Grievance Adm'r v. Fink, 612 N.W.2d 397,399 (Mich. 2000).42 State v. Acciardo, 748 A.2d 811 (R.I. 2000).
43 United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming personal-injury
lawyers' conviction of RICO conspiracy to defraud insurers through scheme to press
groundless personal injury claims through subomed perjury, false documents, etc.).
45 See, e.g., in re Neufeld, 704 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("There is a wealth of
controlling authority in this [court] supporting disbarment under these circumstances
[citing cases].").
46 See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming conviction of
lawyer for mail fraud arising out of representation of clients with conflicting interests). Cf.,
e.g., United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing, for insufficient
evidence of scienter, conviction of lawyer - brother of then junior Senator from New York -
for mail fraud in over-billing government agency).
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profitably in the stock market on information that the lawyer had gained
from confidential law firm information about its clients.47 The aptness of
such an application of the criminal law to lawyers can hardly be
doubted. As mentioned, the offense is particularly objectionable because
it is committed by a fiduciary against a person, the client, who is both the
singular object of the lawyer's fiduciary duty and is highly vulnerable to
being victimized. 48 Second, and flowing from that reason, there can be
no objection to the use here of the criminal law on the ground that it
would chill a lawyer in functioning in that role. Instead, such "chilling"
(call it deterrence if you will) comports fully with the objectives of both
the criminal law, the law of fiduciary breach,49 and the lawyer codes5° -
each of which (mutually reinforcing each other) treat such anti-client
conduct as a clear violation of the lawyer's duties.5 1
C. Easy Cases of Law Crime in the Final Analysis
Where do we stand in the final analysis with the "easy cases" of
lawyer criminal responsibility? While many bar leaders and lawyer
critics agree that the level of disciplinary enforcement of lawyers is in
several respects still deficient,52 discipline of lawyers who have already
been convicted of a criminal offense remains a bedrock basis for
professional discipline. While I know of no supporting statistics, my
firm impression is that, in most jurisdictions, almost any serious crime
by a lawyer will lead ineluctably to substantial discipline. That provides
an apt occasion for raising a fundamental question of theory: given the
greater availability of professional discipline today, why is it any longer
necessary to bring to bear on many lawyers the additional sanctions of
the criminal law? Would it not suffice to handle all lawyer crimes as
disciplinary offenses under the established lawyer-discipline system?
17 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (divided Court affirms conviction on
"misappropriation-based" count, and unanimous Court affirms on mail fraud count).
49 See supra p. 85.
19 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at ch. 3.
50 See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 24, at DR 9-102 (same);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 24, at R. 1.15 (disciplinary rule imposing
several per se rules with respect to client property).
s That is seen, among other things, in the law of fiduciary breach and its multiplication of
special remedies for the injured client, such as the imposition of a constructive trust on
profits made by the faithless lawyer. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 60 cmt. j
(discussing disgorgement as a remedy for lawyer's wrongful act of profiting from
confidential client information, even if activity actually causes client no harm).
52 See generally McKay Commission Report, supra note 27 (illustrating the bar's own
assessment, which reflects less than complete satisfaction with the state of lawyer
discipline).
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The fundamental objection to such a radical change, of course, is that
the system of lawyer discipline is insufficiently public and insufficiently
accountable to warrant the degree of public confidence that would be
required before it could be argued to be a fit replacement for the criminal
law. Further, the objective of professional discipline is mainly to limit a
lawyer's practice - fully by suspension or partly through probation or
supervised practice - or to preclude it altogether through disbarment.
The criminal law, on the other hand, seeks to deter both the perpetrator
and others similarly disposed so that they will not commit future
crimes. 53 That objective assumes a punishment sufficient for that broadly
deterrent purpose. Few, including few lawyers, would accept the
proposition that professional discipline would, or could, provide
deterrence as effective as that provided by the criminal law.
Apart from theory and viewed solely as a matter of process, the
procedures of lawyer discipline are ill-designed for processing charges
that lawyers have committed criminal offenses. Even in those states,
now the vast majority, that prosecute lawyer discipline cases with
professional staff,54 the staff is not trained in the much different
requirements of criminal procedure. In almost all states, lawyer
discipline proceedings take place in secret (or at least not in accordance
with the public-trial requirement of the Constitution),55 and many other
53See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1962) (listing several purposes of criminal law,
including forms of deterrence); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.5 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing deterrence purposes of criminal law); PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (1997) (same).
54 See McKay Commission Report, supra note 27, at 95-97 (noting significant increase in
professional discipline, but lingering problems, including, even in some states with large
lawyer populations, over-reliance on volunteers to screen or prosecute complaints); see also
id. at 98 (finding that "[ipn individual jurisdictions, lack of funding and staff often results in
insufficient training of both disciplinary agency staff and adjudicators .... [T]raining of
disciplinary officials and staff remains a problem...").
55 Despite the recommendation of the McKay Commission that all disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers be accessible to the public, most states maintain secrecy until
announcement of a public disciplinary sanction. McKay Commission Report, supra note 27,
at 34-39. State courts have rejected attempts, on a variety of theories, to open up closed
disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., In Re Burling, 651 A.2d 940 (N.H. 1994) (rejecting
petition to make public a disciplinary file on a specific lawyer); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 714 A.2d 402, 403 n.2 (Pa. 1998) (noting that, pursuant
to disciplinary enforcement rule providing for secrecy, identity of lawyer undergoing
disciplinary investigation would remain confidential in appeal raising question of proper
burden of proof); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993) (rejecting on grounds
of quasi-judicial immunity, a suit by clients for negligence of bar association in failing to
disclose pattern of misconduct by lawyers). But see, e.g., Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. On
Legal Ethics, 326 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1984) (holding that press had constitutional right to
access lawyer discipline proceedings). Some of the applications of the secrecy rules seem
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procedures constitutionally required for criminal prosecutions, such as
trial by jury,56 appointed counsel,57 and respect for the privilege against
self-incrimination,58 are not observed.
More importantly, the politics are wrong. Even if all necessary
procedures were adopted to bring lawyer discipline even modestly into
accord with the minimal requirements of criminal procedure, the
imagined process clearly would not gain public confidence that it could
regularly achieve the objectives of the criminal law. The wrong body
would make the rules. Even after reforms effected in most states during
the last part of the twentieth century transferred much power to shape
lawyer code rules from lawyers and their bar associations to public
bodies, the practical power to define lawyer disciplinary offenses still lies
largely in the hands of lawyers. 59 In many states, lawyers' bar
associations still play an important role, in some states amounting to de
facto control of the process. Even if courts took a much more active role
in lawyer "criminal discipline" than is true now of lawyer discipline
highly problematic. See, e.g. Attorney T. v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 547 A.2d 350
(Pa. 1988) (holding that, prior to adjudication, disciplinary counsel could not disclose
information about lawyer to requesting disciplinary authorities in another state in which
lawyer was also admitted).
56Compare Clark Committee Report, supra note 35, at 136 (commenting on a 1970 ABA
report that Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas permitted trial by jury in lawyer-discipline
cases), with McKay Commission Report, supra note 27, at 117 (jury trial still permitted in
Georgia and Texas).
s7 See, e.g., In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753, 762-63 (Ariz. 1991) (holding no right to appointed
counsel in disciplinary proeeding); Walker v. State Bar, 783 P.2d 184, 188-89 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that in proceeding for disbarment lawyer not entitled to appointed counsel under
due process clause); Florida Bar v. Winn, 593 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1992) (holding that
lawyer has no right to state-funded appointed counsel, but does have right to self-
representation or retained counsel). Cf. in re Campbell, 544 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (holding that, in absence of extraordinary circumstances, no right to appointment of
counsel in disciplinary proceeding based on criminal conviction in another state).
m' The key decision is Baxter v. Pahnigiano, holding (in a prison disciplinary context, but
applied quite broadly) that it generally would not offend the privilege against self-
incrimination for the subject of discipline to be given the choice of either complying with a
request to testify or facing an adverse inference from a claim of a right to remain silent. 425
U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976). In the lawyer-discipline context, the view is very widely followed.
See, e.g., In Re Henley, 518 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. 1999) (holding that an adverse inference is
justified in context of production of documents); In Re Kadish, 669 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (holding it permissible to draw a negative inference from a lawyer's failure to
explain missing client funds). Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Gasaway, 863
P.2d 1189, 1201 (Okla. 1993) (holding that, under state bar rule permitting such, lawyer
invoking right against self-incrimination could refuse to answer formal complaint without
admitting allegations).
39 See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389
(1992) (tracing the increasing ascendancy of judge-made law in regulating lawyers).
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generally, the involvement of courts itself would be highly
problematical. In most states, the entire lawyer-discipline process is
subject to the regulatory control of the jurisdiction's highest court, and to
that body alone. 60 Specifically, this discipline process excludes the
legislature from regulating lawyers in the practice of law and, according
to some courts, lawyers in other roles.6' Unless that concept were
discarded, courts would be in the highly compromised position of
formulating the criminal law of lawyer crimes through a rulemaking or
common-law process that, under state constitutions, would be
purportedly immune from overhaul or tinkering by democratically-
elected state legislatures, while at the same time applying that law
against lawyers.
No one, of course, has attempted to present a thorough-going
argument that the lawyer discipline system should take over the
adjudication of lawyer crimes.62 Shortcomings similar to those just
60 This concept, which I have termed the 'negative aspect of the inherent-powers doctrine,'
is given widespread recognition. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 1 cmt. c; MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 20, at § 2.2.3; Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation-The Role of the lihierent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 6
(1989-90). The "affirmative" form of the doctrine is well-established in Indiana, and its
highest court has intimated a strong form of the "negative" aspect. See In re State Bar Ass'n
Petition, 550 N.E.2d 311, 312 (Ind. 1990) (upholding bar association program for interest on
lawyers' trust accounts, stating that, under state constitution, "the Indiana Supreme Court
is vested with the exclusive responsibility and duty to supervise the admission of
applicants to the practice of law, supervise the discipline and disbarment of lawyers, and
prohibit the unauthorized practice of law"). The claim is somewhat tenuously based on the
following language from Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution dealing with the
original jurisdiction of the state supreme court: "The Supreme Court shall have no original
jurisdiction except in admission to the practice of law; discipline or disbarment of those
admitted; the unauthorized practice of law; discipline, removal, and retirement of justices
and judges; supervision of the exercise of jurisdiction by the other courts of the State; and
issuance of writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction." IN CONST. art. VII, § 4.
61 On extravagantly broad holdings of an exclusive power in the state's courts to displace
contray attempts by the state legislature to regulate lawyers in their law practice, see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12 at § 1 cmt. c., at 13; see also, e.g., Kury v. Commonwealth, 435
A.2d 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 1981) (holding invalid as applied to lawyers an act of legislature
prohibiting conflicts of interest of former members of the state legislature in appearances
before state administrative agencies).
Different, but problematical for its own reasons, is the situation created by the court's
decision in Coininonwealth v. Stenhach. 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 534
A.2d 769 (Pa. 1987). See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The court first announced
a requirement that a lawyer turn over evidence of a client crime removed from a crime
scene in described circumstances and held that the lawyers in question had violated that
requirement. See Stenhach, 514 A.2d at 123. But the court went on to hold that the criminal
statutes under which the lawyers were prosecuted were unconstitutionally overbroad
because the statutes would cover situations involving proper lawyer conduct, and on that
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considered would preclude resort to any other familiar system as an
alternative to criminal prosecution, such as the legal malpractice
adjudicatory system, whose procedures in some respects may be more in
line with criminal procedure than is true of the lawyer-discipline system.
That said, however, and on the assumption that it would be
insupportable to cloak lawyers with a general immunity from the normal
operation of the criminal law, one has also accepted a large - if still
undefined - role for the criminal law in regulating lawyers.
III. CRIMINALIZING TRADITIONAL LAW PRACTICE: THE TOUGHEST CASES
We move then from solid ground into more uncertain terrain to
those situations that undoubtedly pose the most difficult questions and
the most pressing concerns - those in which a lawyer is charged with an
offense during the course of representing a client, and in which it could
be argued seriously that the traditional role of a lawyer encompassed the
lawyer's actions. Those most difficult cases have gratefully been few and
far between, but they have, naturally enough, given rise to the sharpest
disagreement between prosecutors and lawyers. To take us through this
particular minefield, I have chosen as illustrative two decisions that are
probably entitled to be called the leading decisions on point.63 Both are
federal appellate decisions, written by well-known jurists, against
interesting factual records, that nicely pose the hard questions for us.
Unfortunately, the courts' analyses have been hardly correct or even
particularly illuminating.
In the first case, United States v. Cintolo,64 the First Circuit affirmed
the conviction of a lawyer for obstruction of justice, principally on
evidence that the lawyer, William J. Cintolo,65 had advised his client to
basis the court vacated the lawyers' convictions. See id. at 125-27. The court also intimated
that its result was not impelled by the otherwise quite strong Pennsylvania version of the
"inherent powers" doctrine under which only the courts can regulate lawyers. Id. "[The
courts have the power, outside the context of criminal sanctions, to regulate the conduct of
attorneys practicing before them." Id. (emphasis added). The apparent upshot is that,
pending possible legislative repair to fix the overbroad features of the statute, lawyer
discipline would be the only permissible basis for sanctioning violations of the court's rule
on evidence tampering.
63 Importantly, the decisions examined below are the only two reported decisions directly
on point. Other opinions have contributed to the body of law, but mainly through dicta.
Other prosecutions raising the most difficult questions might, of course, have occurred -
and some undoubtedly have, but they have not generated reported decisions.
6818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
'3One perusing a contemporary Boston phone book will find a William J. Cintolo listed
there as a practicing lawyer. See, e.g., http://yp.yahoo.com (last visited on October 31,
2001). Cintolo was indefinitely suspended after his conviction, served his criminal sentence
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plead the Fifth Amendment when called to testify before a grand jury.
Eleven years later, in United States v. Cueto,6 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the conviction of lawyer, Amiel Cueto, for obstruction of justice and
conspiracy to defraud the United States because the lawyer had, on
behalf of a client, filed lawsuits in state and federal courts. Such
lawyering activities as advising a client confronting a grand jury
summons about the Fifth Amendment and filing suits on behalf of a
client appear, at one level, to be entirely traditional lawyer work
involving lawful activity on the part of the client, and hence, derivatively
lawful activity on the part of the lawyer. We should thus be concerned
immediately that prosecution of the lawyers involved in those and
similar cases, wrongly would chill all lawyers in the performance of
those lawful tasks. That, to be sure, was the principal argument on
appeal - appeals, in each instance, that were supported by organizations
of state and national criminal defense lawyers that presented their
positions as amicus curiae. On the other hand, as we will see, the
specific facts before the court in each instance made the finding of
criminality ultimately sustainable, if not compelling.
Cintolo and Cueto are strikingly similar in several ways quite useful
for our present analysis. 67 Fortunately for us, they also both involve
charges primarily of the same federal offense - obstruction of justice.6
in thirteen months, and has been reinstated to practice law in Massachusetts with the
enthusiastic support of the Boston-area criminal defense bar. See Ralph Ranalli, Disbarred
Mob Lawyer to be Reinstated in tly, BOSTON HERALD, June 21, 1995, at 12, available at 1994
WL 5673770. Mr. Cintolo currently works as a lawyer in the Boston area for the law firm
Cosgrove, Eisenberg & Kiley, P.C. My research assistant, Mauricio A. Gonzalez, called and
spoke to Mr. Cintolo at the firm's office. Mr. Cintolo confirmed that the firm does advertise
in the Boston Yellow Pages but without his name.
6151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
671 do not list all the striking similarities in the text. Among other things, the decisions also
suggest (but neither discusses) the substantive question whether it is permissible for a
lawyer to agree to provide legal counsel on an ongoing basis to members of an enterprise
that, to the lawyer's knowledge, engage in a continuing course of criminal conduct where
the lawyer's services will directly involve that conduct. A negative answer is strongly
implied in the discussion in Cueto of the seemingly more modest charge of a RICO
violation. In such a case, a federal prosecutor would presumably also charge a RICO
conspiracy, with the requisite predicate acts being the lawyer's otherwise-typical legal
services and the requisite predicate crimes being the substantive violations involved in the
ongoing criminal enterprise.
6Criminal-defense lawyers who know the facts of the Cintolo decision well might cringe.
To set the record straight, Cintolo involved an indictment consisting of two counts charging
obstruction and one count charging conspiracy to commit obstruction under 18 U.S.C. §§
371 & 1503. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 983. Lawyer Cintolo was, in fact, found guilty by the
jury only on the conspiracy count, and there are surely important differences between the
conspiracy and substantive counts for purposes of substantive criminal law and, perhaps
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We may thus concentrate our substantive attention on that one federal
criminal offense. The offense, as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1503,69 applies to
the actions of a person who "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes,
or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice."7° As will be seen, there are also striking similarities in the way
that each court approached the question of the relationship between the
criminal law and the practice of law. Following ample precedent, both
courts emphasized that the line between legitimate lawyering and
criminal conduct is profoundly factual rather than legal. First, that line
"must inevitably be drawn case by case." 71 For both courts, that meant
that there is no room for per se rules, irrebuttable presumptions of
correct lawyer behavior, or similar sorts of bright lines or safe harbors for
determining questions of lawyer criminality.72 Second, placement of that
more importantly, evidence and similar rules. Nonetheless, in the critical portion of Cintolo
dealing with the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue as to Cintolo's role as a lawyer. See id. at
989-96. The court deals mainly with the concept of obstruction of justice as the "gravamen
of the accusation." Id. at 984. No important aspect of the court's substantive discussion
appears to turn on differences between the obstruction and conspiracy-to-obstruct counts.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
'o 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (a). While it might be missed on a first reading, it should be carefully
noted that § 1503, in effect, describes two sets of conduct as obstruction. Both sets involve
conduct that "influences, obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice." Id. But that can be accomplished either (1)
"corruptly" or (2) "by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication." Id.
In both cases that we will examine, the lawyer-defendant was not charged with the second
type of obstruction, but merely of acting "corruptly."
The court in Cintolo overruled lawyer Cintolo's objection that the obstruction statute
was void for vagueness-as-applied. See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 996-97. Those not concerned
with upholding the statute (as would any court confronted with an argument that it was
unconstitutional) would have to agree that, even if minimally constitutional, the wording
of Section 1503 hardly provides a clear roadmap of the offense, for lawyers or anyone else.
The effort of the Cintolo court to define the key term "corruptly" is singularly unhelpful,
other than affirming that the term is applied "broadly." Id. at 991; see also Cueto, 151 F.3d at
630 (quoting approvingly from United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200,206-07 (5th Cir. 1979),
to the effect that Congress purposefully drafted the obstruction statute in broad terms in
order to deal with the great variety of ways that the "imagination of the criminally
inclined" might devise to impede or thwart the administration of justice) (citation omitted).
71 Both decisions employ the same formulation. The court in Cintdolo noted that "[w]hatever
the contours of the line between traditional lawyering and corrupt intent may be, they
must inevitably be drawn case-by-case." Cinitolo, 818 F.2d at 995. The court in Cueto noted
that "[w]hatever the contours of the line between traditional lawyering and criminal
conduct, they must inevitably be drawn case-by-case." Cueto, 151 F.3d at 634 (noting that
the potential danger of permitting prosecutors to "inquire into the motives of criminal
defense lawyers ad hoc" was not raised here because the court's "conclusion [was] limited
to the specific facts of this case").
72 See, e.g., Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631 ("an individual's status as an attorney engaged in
litigation-related conduct does not provide protection from prosecution for criminal
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line ultimately depends on a factual determination (thus to be made
almost without effective possibility of reversal on subsequent appellate
review) in the first instance by the jury, and, subject to substantial
restrictions, by the trial judge in reviewing a guilty verdict.n Third,
those fundamental factual elements turn mainly on that most intangible
and elusive of inquiries into the "corrupt" state of mind or "intent" of an
accused lawyer, again basedon contested facts74
Most dramatically, each case raises deeply troubling concerns
because both defendants were criminal-defense lawyers being
prosecuted for acts that they took in the course of providing what the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution treats as a bedrock
right of all citizens defending themselves against the state in criminal
cases: the right to counsel. Both decisions involve a complex set of facts
and contested evidence. Both are lengthy, dealing with a host of
objections, and I here touch on only a portion of relevant discussion. I
take these decisions up in the order in which they were decided: Cintolo
in 1987, and Cueto in 1998.
conduct"); Cititolo, 818 F.2d at 990, 992 (rejecting the argument of a lawyer and amici that
"[s]o long as lawyer tenders facially legitimate explanation for conduct performed in the
course of his defense of a client," the factfinder must evaluate conduct in question on that
basis alone, and refusing to accept argument of lawyer and amici that a lawyer's "corrupt
motive may not be found in conduct which is, itself, not independently illegal"); see also
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73 See Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 983; Cueto, 151 F.3d at 629-30.
74 See Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631 ("[lt is not the means employed by the defendant that are
specifically prohibited by the statute; instead, it is the defendant's corrupt endeavor which
motivated the action .... It is undisputed that an attorney may use any lawfid means to
defend his client, and there is no risk of criminal liability if those means employed by the
attorney in his endeavors to represent his client remain within the scope of lawful conduct.
However, it is the corrupt endeavor.., which motivated Cueto's otherwise legal conduct,
that separates his conduct from that which is legal."); Cintfolo, 818 F.2d at 995 ("We
recognize the dangers that are present if prosecutors can be allowed to inquire into motive
in such confined circumstances, and we respect the importance of allowing defense counsel
to perform legitimate activities without let or hindrance. We do not see this case, however,
edging into that forbidden terrain.").
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A. United States v. Cintolo75
Cintolo involved as the lawyer's client Gennaro Angiulo, who used
his apartment as headquarters for his illegal gambling and loan-sharking
businesses.76 What was unknown to Angiulo, his associates, or lawyer
William Cintolo was that their extensive conversations in the apartment
were all being secretly recorded by the FBI."7 Walter LaFreniere was a
customer of both businesses.78 He had run up large debts on the
gambling side of the business and was thus haplessly under the heel of
the loan-sharking side79 Various of Angiulo's minions had already
subjected LaFreniere to unpleasantness in unsuccessful attempts to
enforce his indebtedness to Angiulo.80  Federal agents, knowing
LaFreniere's plight and evidently hoping to persuade him to serve as a
sympathetic witness, attempted to interview him and summon him to
testify before a grand jury that, as Angiulo and his henchmen accurately
speculated, was investigating Angiulo's illegal businesses. 81
When LaFreniere first appeared before the grand jury, he refused to
testify on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds.82 Concerned
that LaFreniere might be granted immunity, and thereafter, coerced into
testifying under threat of criminal contempt, Angiulo wished to have
LaFreniere "stand up" - that is, even if granted immunity, commit
criminal contempt by refusing to testify and suffer the months of ensuing
imprisonment rather than give damaging testimony (or risk commiting
perjury, with its longer sentence).8 Angiulo thus directed an associate to
escort LaFreniere to lawyer Cintolo's office for what was apparently
their first meeting.84 Shortly thereafter, Cintolo met with Angiulo and
associates in the absence of LaFreniere.85  From this and later
75 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987). As a reading of the full opinion in Cintolo will show, I give
here only a truncated account of the court's necessarily condensed recounting of the facts.
Judge Selya's opinion, written with characteristic wit, is a fair smattering of sarcasm and
displays of recondite terminology that will require many close readers of the opinion to
navigate it with a good dictionary at hand (an exercise that would also have better served
the author of the opinion at several points).




81 United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980,984 (1st Cir. 1987).
82Id.
83 Id. at 985.
8Id.
85Id. LaFreniere was apparently not called as a witness by either side in Cintolo's trial. The
First Circuit does not mention whether Cintolo's frequent discussions with Angiulo and
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conversations between Cintolo and Angiulo, all recorded verbatim, it is
clear and was conceded by Cintolo that he was aware that Angiulo was
uncertain whether he could trust LaFreniere not to testify, even if that
meant his imprisonment, and that Angiulo was actively considering
other alternatives, such as having LaFreniere murdered by his
associates.86  Cintolo's conversation indicated that he was entirely
willing, even eager, to share with Angiulo all information that
LaFreniere provided to him as his lawyer, and that he understood and
supported Angiulo's objective of persuading LaFreniere, by threats if
necessary, not to testify even if immunized but instead, to accept lengthy
imprisonment for criminal contempt.87 Indeed, Cintolo was at some
pains to reassure Angiulo that he had repeatedly instructed his client as
Angiulo wished.88
When LaFreniere was called back before the grand jury and, as
expected, provided with broad immunity from prosecution, he read
from a script prepared and given to him by Cintolo, still refusing to
testify.8 9 As rehearsed by Cintolo, LaFreniere invoked Fifth Amendment
grounds that the court would later hold to be "clearly frivolous." 90
LaFreniere, accompanied by Cintolo as his champion, was subsequently
held in contempt and sentenced to an eighteen-month term of
others out of LaFreniere's presence violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to
LaFreniere, on the assumption that the latter was his only client in the matter. See id.
86 Id. at 985-86.
97 United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 985-86 (1st Cir. 1987).
u Id. During one apartment conversation just after federal and state tax filing dates had
passed, Cintolo changed the subject from the question of LaFreniere's trustworthiness and
revealed to Angiulo a scheme he claimed to have concocted. Id. at 988 n.4. Under it,
Angiulo and several of his associates would pool funds for Cintolo to make an otherwise
anonymous tax payment, which he would later claim to be on behalf of whichever one of
them was later singled out for tax violations. Id. Cintolo had evidently become aware of
the Ninth Circuit decision, Baird v. Koerner, in which the court, purportedly applying
California law, held that a lawyer could not be forced to testify as to the identity of clients
on whose behalf he had made an anonymous tax payment on the ground that such
coercion would violate the attorney-client privilege. See Baird, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
Courts generaly have limited Baird to its facts. See generally In re Grand Jury Proceeding,
680 F.2d 1026,1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (stating that Baird-type application of attorney-
client privilege is "limited and narrow exception"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 69
cmt. g, reporter's note at 533-34; MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 20, at 260-61. The
Ninth Circuit has itself greatly limited Baird. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that Baird is to be "narrowly applied").
89 Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 988.
90 Id. On the state of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence supporting this characterization, see
id. at 988 n.5.
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imprisonment, which he served in full.91 As Angiulo would put it, he
"stood up" well indeed.
At his trial, Cintolo testified that "he had not acted with the intent
corruptly to obstruct or impede" the work of the grand jury.92 Instead,
he claimed that, fearing for his client LaFreniere's welfare, he had played
the role of double agent, masquerading before Angiulo to appear as if
cooperating with him, but solely for the purpose of being able to counsel
better his own client.93 Thus, the central issue with respect to the
sufficiency of evidence was whether, in view of Cintolo's sworn
statement of an alternative, non-corrupt motive for his activities in
advising LaFreniere about the Fifth Amendment, the jury should have
been permitted to find, as evidently it did, that his explanation was
false. 94 It was here that amicus briefs of lawyer organizations took the
position that the jury should have been instructed that they had to accept
Cintolo's self-justification, so long as the lawyer had tendered a "facially
legitimate explanation for conduct performed in the course of his
defense of a client."95 The facial legitimacy, of course, refers not to the
frivolous Fifth Amendment objection, but to Cintolo's sworn claim that
his motive, in his role of double agent, was to protect his client and not to
further the mob's obstruction of the grand jury inquiry.
That, however, the First Circuit refused to do, holding that the jury
was entitled to reject Cintolo's defense as incredible and accept instead
the competing and entirely plausible interpretation urged by the
prosecution.% The court also found ample record evidence on which a
jury could rest its finding that Cintolo's purpose in participating in the
scheme to persuade LaFreniere not to testify was, as Section 1503
specified, "corrupt."97 As the court put it, "[tihe fact that this
participation was clothed, at least in part, in the mantle of superficially
'professional' conduct does not exonerate the lawyer from culpability,"
for, according to the court, "acceptance of a retainer by a lawyer in a
9' Id. at 988-89.
92 Id. at 989.
9 Id. There is no indication in the appellate decision whether expert testimony had been
offered at Cintolo's trial on such matters as whether such a role was plausible or whether a
reasonable lawyer would have simply notified authorities of the threats against his client.
See id. While portions of the court's opinion are rather heavily sarcastic, there is no
mention whether the court would approve or disapprove of a lawyer playing such a
double role in preference to deploying more obviously client-protective strategies. See id.
"I d. at 989-90.
95 United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980,990 (1st Cir. 1987).
96 Id. at 989.
97 Id. at 990.
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criminal case cannot become functionally equivalent to the lawyer's
acceptance of a roving commission to flout the criminal law with
impunity."98
The Cintolo court's attention in reciting evidence is primarily focused
on the outrageously criminal schemes of Angiulo, and the court also
stresses at several points that LaFreniere was committing a criminal act
in refusing to testify, despite the government's grant of immunity.99
Hence, it might be argued that the critical element for the court was that
Cintolo was assisting his client in a criminal act, and at that on behalf of
an ongoing criminal enterprise. But such a reading would be directly at
odds with the court's extended analysis of precedent from other circuits,
in which the court invokes other Section 1503 decisions affirming
convictions for acts by a non-lawyer that amounted to nothing more than
urging a prospective grand jury witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment
in the first instance in order to protect a third person, which it would be
the lawful right of the witness to do.100 In an ensuing discussion of a
series of hypothetical situations of plausibly innocent acts (such as
purchasing a chisel or driving someone to the airport), the court again
emphasizes that by a "sort of alchemy" an innocent act may be converted
into an unlawful obstruction on proof of corrupt intent.101 In this regard,
the court concludes, a lawyer cannot "be plucked gently from the
madding crowd and sheltered from the rigors" of the obstruction
statute.1' 2 As the court repeatedly stresses, a lawyer must stand in the
same position as non-lawyer with respect to the application of the
obstruction statute. 03 Beyond that, however, the opinion does not offer a
9 Id.
9Id.
10 id. at 992. The court approvingly discusses Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964), as such a decision. Id. Even more directly in point, as
the court notes in Cintolo, is United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 US. 917 (1974), where the court explicitly rejected an argument that urging another
person to do what they were legally entitled to do could not be corrupt within the meaning
of the obstruction statute. Id. at 992-93. See generally Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119.
in United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980,993 (1st Cir. 1987).
102 Id.
113 See also, e.g., id. at 996 (stating "[b]y our reckoning, attorneys cannot be relieved of
obligations of lawfulness imposed on the citizenry at large. Acceptable notions of
evenhanded justice require that statutes like § 1503 apply to all persons, without
preferment or favor. As sworn officers of the court, lawyers should not seek to avail
themselves of relaxed rules of conduct. To the exact contrary, they should be held to the
very highest standards in promoting the cause of justice" and stating, "[w]e see nothing to
recommend the proposition that attorneys can be of easier virtue than the rest of society in
terms of the criminal code. As citizens of the Republic equal under law, all must comply
with the same statute in the same manner").
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significantly instructive analysis because, despite its apparent erudition,
it offers only hints at its rationale. Apparently, at the end of a lengthy
opinion, we find only that equating lawyers with non-lawyers under the
obstruction statute rests on an assumed tenet of democracy under which
all citizens are to be treated equally. Cueto, unfortunately, offers even
less by way of rationale, in part because the evidence of criminality is, if
anything, more compelling.
B. United States v. Cueto'04
Cueto, like Cintolo, involved a criminal enterprise of an equally
institutionalized and extensive scope. Thomas Venezia owned B & H
Vending. Through it, he operated a video gambling business that
prospered through illegal gambling payouts to the employees of bars in
the East St. Louis area, where Venezia had installed video poker game
machines.105 Use of the machines in connection with such payouts
violates state and federal gambling and racketeering laws. 106 Venezia
retained lawyer Amiel Cueto for personal legal representation and to
defend bar owners who might be prosecuted for their participation in the
business.107 Following an extensive federal-state investigation that had
several twists and turns, Venezia and B & H were indicted and convicted
on federal racketeering and related charges.10 In a pattern that one sees
in several similar cases,109 Venezia then agreed, in return for a
recommended reduction in his sentence, to cooperate with federal
prosecutors in their investigation and ultimate prosecution of his own
104 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998).
105 Id. at 624.
106 Id. The court noted that games of chance that consume coins and reward "winnings"
with game replays are legal; payoffs in the form of cash or liquor by bar owners cross the
line into illegal gambling. Id. at 625 n.2.
107 Id. at 625.
10B Id.
10 At a point in its analysis of Cueto's guilt, the court notes that the government's theory of
prosecution was predicated on Cueto's holding of a personal financial interest in protecting
Venezia's illegal gambling operation through a series of investments. See supra note 100.
This, it was argued, provided the basis for a finding of his corrupt intent under 18 U.S.C. §
1503. See Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631. At this point, the court appends a footnote stating that the
court was "puzzled why the government did not indict and prosecute Cueto in the
underlying racketeering case" and expresses "concem[.about the relationship between the
instant appeal and the underlying prosecution of the gambling operation and the
racketeering enterprise." Id. at 631 n.10. The puzzlement and concern are not further
identified, but rather obviously have to do with the transparent motives of the government.
See id. Nonetheless, the court pushes the point no further. Id. The point of the footnote, if
intending to signify something more than providing evidence of judicial naivete, is
obscure.
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lawyer Cueto who had advised Venezia up until he was indicted. 110
Note here how client testimony (waiving, of course, the attorney-client
privilege) takes the place of the verbatim recording of conversations in
Cintolo. Note also that a successful criminal lawyer, as with any other
criminal in a multi-person crime, needs complete and long-lasting client
loyalty to escape conviction. Venezia, as with many other clients, did not
"stand up.""'
In rejecting Cueto's void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal
obstruction statute, the Seventh Circuit insisted that the concept of
"corrupt" endeavor was sufficiently definite - at least for a lawyer.112
According to the court:" 3
[a]s a lawyer, [Cueto] possessed a heightened awareness
of the law and its scope, and he cannot claim lack of fair
notice as to what conduct is proscribed by § 1503 to
shield himself from criminal liability, particularly when
he was already 'bent on serious wrongdoing! . . . 114
More so than an ordinary individual, an attorney, in
particular a criminal defense attorney, has a
sophisticated understanding of the type of conduct that
constitutes criminal violations of the law. There is a
discernable difference between an honest lawyer who
110 Id. at 628 n.8. Also indicted along with Cueto were Venezia himself and a third
codefendant, a local public official who served as an "investigator" for Cueto and Venezia
during the federal-state investigation of B & H. At least two other public officials play
major supporting roles. See id. at 625-28. One was a state court judge who agreed to
Cueto's extraordinary request for an immediate hearing of a motion for preliminary
injunction against a hitherto undercover FBI agent, when notice of the suit and the motion
was served only moments before on the agent, who appeared without counsel and whom
the court refused to permit to put on a defense. See id. at 626. The other was a federal
Congressman who, perhaps unwittingly, supported portions of Cueto's scheme and
appeared to have had a partnership with Cueto in some gambling-related real estate. See id.
at 627-28.
M1 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
112 A similar theme of you-should-have-known-better has met similar lawyer arguments of
ignorance or reliance. See, e.g., United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting lawyer's argument that he relied on representation of Southern District of New
York federal prosecutors that they would recommend reduction of penalties in his District
of New Jersey prosecution, on ground that, as lawyer, defendant should have known that
only United States attorney in district of prosecution had such power). See generally
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, stipra note 20, at 18.
113 Cueto, 151 F.3d at 631-32.
114 [Author's footnote.] Id. at 631 (quoting from United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 200, 206-
07 (5th Cir. 1979)) (stating that void-for-vagueness doctrine not a shield for those already
bent on wrongdoing).
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unintentionally submits a false statement to the court
and an attorney with specific corrupt intentions who
files papers in bad faith knowing that they contain false
representations and/or inaccurate facts in an attempt to
hinder judicial proceedings. It is true that to a certain
extent, a. lawyer's conduct influences judicial
proceedings, or at least attempts to affect the outcome of
the proceedings. However, that influence stems from a
lawyer's attempt to advocate his client's interests, within
the scope of the law. It is the 'corrupt endeavor' to
influence the due administration of justice that is the
heart of the offense, and Cueto's personal financial
interest" s is the heart of his corrupt motive.
We can also be assured that the court's surmise about lawyers' abilities
of penetrating insight is surmise, not based on any record evidence of
Cueto's individual skills. So much, then, for arguments that applying
the criminal law to lawyers will "chill" their work for their clients.116
According to the Seventh Circuit, lawyers, much less than enjoying
immunity from the criminal law, labor under special disabilities that
make them, if anything, even more vulnerable to conviction for
obstruction - including presumed knowledge of the meaning of highly
obscure criminal statutes.117
How well do Cueto's activities match the contours of traditional law
practice? The charges against Cueto mainly concerned his work for his
clients Venezia and B & H, in connection with the federal-state anti-
gambling investigation." 8 The one representational matter that we will
examine here concerned Cueto's legal work in pressing a state court
lawsuit against one Bonds Robinson, an FBI undercover officer," 9 whose
115 [Author's footnote.] The "business interests" to which the court refers involved financial
transactions and business deals that lawyer Cueto and client Venezia entered into after the
client-lawyer relationship commenced. Included was a topless nightclub, an asbestos-
removal company, and Venezia's purchase of Cueto's office building, moving B & H's
corporate headquarters into it. Id.
116 The foregoing observations immediately precede the court's rejection of the argument in
an amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers that
affirmance of Cueto's "sweeping prosecution will sufficiently chill vigorous advocacy and
eventually destroy the delicate balance between prosecution and defense which is
necessary to maintain the effective operation of the criminal justice system." Id. at 632.
117 Id. at 631.
11s Id. at 628-30.
119 Robinson was employed by the Illinois Liquor Control Commission. United States v.
Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1998). At some point, Robinson assumed a role as
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work had led to several successful raids on B & H-supplied bars and
caused the arrest of several bar employees, obviously threatening B &
H's illegal gambling business.120 Cueto apparently knew of Robinson's
role (the court does not allude to this aspect of the evidence) and
apparently decided to "out" him. He first filed the state-court lawsuit,
Venezia v. Robinson, but did not immediately serve the papers. Cueto
instead obtained a court order directing Robinson to appear as a witness
in one of the pending state criminal proceedings arising out of a raid.' 21
When Robinson appeared to testify, Cueto served him with a subpoena
that gave him fifteen minutes to appear for an injunction hearing, in
which Venezia sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against
Robinson's interference with Venezia's business.12 Robinson, who had
not seen a copy of the complaint, had not been served with process, and
was not represented by counsel, was, of course, not prepared to
respond.12 The state court judge nonetheless denied Robinson's request
for counsel, permitted Cueto to cross-examine him extensively about the
FBI investigation of Venezia (which to that point had been covert, if not
terribly successfully so), and then entered a preliminary injunction
indefinitely enjoining Robinson.124  While the injunction was
subsequently thrown out once the case was removed to federal court, 25
Venezia had been provided an opportunity to cross-examine the FBI's
chief undercover operative investigating his client.
The ensuing federal prosecution of Cueto was simplified greatly by
the fact that Cueto, by entering into extensive business partnerships with
Venezia, 126 provided ample evidentiary basis for a finding of motive for
undercover agent for the FBI, posing as a corrupt liquor agent, in order to gather evidence
against Venezia and B & H. In this pose, he had sent word to Venezia that he could limit
the investigations if Venezia would pay him a bribe. Id.
12 Id. at 633.
121 Id. at 626.
122 Id. at 626.
123 Id
.
124 For later developments in the long-running saga of Venezia v. Robinson and its progeny,
in state and federal court, see id. at 626-27. Venezia lost in the federal courts on the obvious
ground that Robinson had been denied due process in the state-court action.
125 See United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1998). While the Seventh Circuit
opinion traces the unsuccessful course of Venezia v. Robinson, it nowhere characterizes the
lawsuit as frivolous, as had the court in Cintolo with respect to lawyer Cintolo's legal
position. Despite silence on that point, it would be preposterous to assume that Cueto's
lawsuit, although it was commenced in a manner that was held to violate the due process
rights of Robinson - and clearly so - nonetheless minimally merited being heard.
126 See id. at 631 ("[t]he government's theory of prosecution is predicated on the fact that
Cueto held a personal financial interest in protecting the illegal gambling enterprise, which
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his "corrupt" lawyering on behalf of client Venezia.'2 Most obviously,
as part-owner of B & H, Cueto stood to lose financially if Robinson's
successful undercover work continued. 28 The court's analysis is taken
from the Cintolo decision, which it extensively cites 29 As had the Cintolo
court, the Cueto court also rejected Cueto's void-for-vagueness attack on
the federal obstruction statute as applied to his activities.13o The court
also found, on Cueto's argument of insufficiency of evidence, that the
trial record overwhelmingly supported the jury's finding.131 In the
course of discussing the evidence, the court held that it was not
necessary that the lawyer's activities be successful in order to constitute
obstruction,132 and that the evidence did not portray Cueto's legitimate
involvement in Venezia's defense or his interferences with the
administration of justice as merely inadvertent.133 The court also held
that Cueto's various advocacy efforts to benefit Venezia (and himself)
were not protected by the First Amendment because criminal activity
does not fall within the scope of protected speech. 34 As to the argument,
which the court addressed throughout its opinion, that Cueto was
involved only in traditional litigation-related activities, the court
responded that "[w]e refuse to accept the notion that lawyers may do
anything, including violating the law, to zealously advocate their clients'
interests, and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they ,were
'just doing their job."'135
Perhaps so, but aside from the colorful - and, I believe, narratively
instructive-facts of both Cintolo and Cueto - neither opinion is
particularly illuminating about how either a lawyer functioning carefully
and in good faith, or a later reviewing court or jury carefully analyzing a
factual record, is to determine whether particular lawyer conduct is
criminal or non-criminal. According to both decisions, acts that are
otherwise entirely lawful - advising a client about his Fifth Amendment
rights or filing and pressing a lawsuit for a client - can nonetheless be
found to be criminal.
formed the requisite corrupt intent for his conduct, to qualify as violations of the
(obstruction statute]").
127 See, e.g., id. at 624.
12 See id. at 625.
12 Id. at 631.
130 Id. at 630-32.
131 United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620,632-34 (7th Cir. 1998).
132 Id. at 633.
133 Id. at 633-34.
134 Id. at 634 n.11.
M Id. at 634.
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Such a loose-jointed state of affairs is troubling. Is there a better way
of marking off where legitimate lawyering ends and lawyers crimes
begin? In light of the facts of these cases and such partial illumination as
they shed, I turn next to such an effort.
IV. CONTEXT: LAWYERING CONSTRAINTS ON THE LAW OF LAWYER CRIMES
The over-arching principle that one might be tempted to take away
from decisions such as Cintolo and Cueto is that lawyers, even when
functioning as such, are constrained by the criminal law to the same
degree as would a non-lawyer performing the same or a similar personal
service. But only a few moment's reflection will indicate convincingly
that this is not so - or at least it is not so in some important areas of law
practice.
It is simply insupportable to say, as Cintolo seems to say, 36 that
lawyers functioning in their professional capacity are subject to all of the
strictures of the criminal law without regard to the professional nature of
their activity. To the contrary, in a significant number of areas, lawyers
operate with special legal license and special legal privileges that make
what otherwise would be wrongful conduct on the part of a non-lawyer
legally permissible for a lawyer to do.
Take the traditional area of law practice that we have been focusing
on thus far - the activities of a criminal defense lawyer. Consider first
what such a lawyer may legitimately do in attempting to obtain the
acquittal of a person the lawyer knows to be guilty of the charged
offense. 137 While largely theoretical discussions have focused on the
lawyer's activities in such a situation, it is not currently doubted in the
legal profession that it is legal - that is, certainly, not in violation of the
criminal law - for a lawyer to do so. 138 Indeed, for a lawyer to fail to
136 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.37 In some discussions of this and similar problems, the extreme epistemological position is
taken that lawyers can never "know" such a thing as the guilt or innocence of their clients
or whether a fact is true or false. While I disagree with Professor Monroe Freedman on
much else, I emphatically agree with his position that such a radical epistemological
position ignores both legal and practical reality and, indeed, it may be very much against
the interests of an accused. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 52-53 (1975); see also, e.g., Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission":
Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 125, 141-43 (1987)
(hereinafter "Subin, Different Mission") (discussing generally and rejecting the radical
epistemological position).
138 See, e.g., GAVIN MACKENZIE, LAWYERS AND ETHICS 4-41 (2000 supp.) (reporting on
compatible Canadian professional view and stating that "there is general agreement among
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assert a legally available defense for such a client, solely on the ground
that the accused client is factually innocent, would itself raise serious
questions of the propriety of the lawyer's activities.1 39 Beyond that basic
point, it is also the dominant professional view that it is legal and even,
according to some lawyers, required that the criminal defense lawyer so
conduct herself that a non-lawyer bystander would believe that the
lawyer is attempting to obtain an acquittal by creating in the jury's mind
a false understanding of the facts.14° This might be attempted, for
commentators that because of the purposes of the criminal justice system, it is proper for
criminal defence lawyers to cross-examine witnesses whom they know to be telling the
truth in such a way as to persuade the court not to believe the witnesses"). Compare ABA
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE PERSONNEL, Standard 7.6 (1971)
(now superseded) (declaring that a lawyer "should not misuse the power of cross-
examination or impeachment by employing it to discredit or undermine a witness if [the
lawyer] knows the witness is testifying truthfully"), DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
AN ETHICAL STUDY 150-53 (1988) (concluding that cross-examination of known truthful
witness cannot be defended by arguments about lawyer's special role), and Subin, Different
Mission, supra note 137, at 135 (finding no discernible redeeming social value in making the
truth appear as a lie in criminal defense), with United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58
(1967) (White, J., concurring) (describing such activity as professionally accepted), Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyering for ]ustice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 155-56 (1990)
(book review of Luban, supra, arguing that such cross-examination is warranted), Monroe
H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469,1474 (1966) (arguing that the attack of truth is necessary to
protect client confidentiality and for effective defense), John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts
Are lhere Yon Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's Position on the Crimninal Lawyer's
"Different Mission," 1 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 339 (1987) (arguing that, for professional and legal
reasons, the practice is justifiable), and Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessanj? Further
Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 689 (1988) (conceding
that Mitchell's argument that precluding defense lawyer from attacking truthful case
against defendant may be incompatible with duty of defense lawyer to assure that
prosecution meets its high burden of proof at trial).
13 Even under the high hurdle created by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
which requires that the convicted client must show both fundamental error on the part of
counsel and "prejudice" that probably affected the outcome of the case to prevail on claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a lawyer who put on no defense based on her belief in
the client's guilt would provide ineffective assistance. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 876 P.2d
357 (Utah 1994) (finding ineffective assistance where lawyer's loyalty to criminal defense
client compromised belief he should be convicted); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C.
1985) (finding per se ineffective assistance where, without consent of accused, defense
lawyer admitted guilt to jury in closing argument).
140 Views have differed on whether such conduct is required. See RESTATEMENT, supra note
12, at § 106 cmt. c, at 141 (taking position that "a lawyer is never required to conduct such
examination"); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LEGAL ETHICS ch. 8 (1990) (cross-
examination of known truthful witness required when doing so would further litigation
position of client-accused); Subin, Different Mission, supra note 137 (considering various
positions that have been advanced, almost all of them in academic or other theoretical
works, and concluding with argument for prohibiting defense lawyer from presenting false
defense).
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example, by cross-examining with forensic demonstrations of deep
skepticism a prosecution witness whom the lawyer knows to be telling
the truth. That could be attempted through such strategems as
peppering the witness with probing, sarcastic, and challenging
questions, all calculated to convey to the finder of fact the lawyer's
disbelief in the testimony as part of the advocate's effort to induce the
jury to share that belief.1 41 The lawyer, in short, may attempt to obtain an
acquittal by creating the false impression that a known true statement is
false, or at least not credible.
While the legal immunity of a criminal defense lawyer to function as
such is, to my mind, a bedrock-solid proposition within the American
criminal-justice system, it is rarely asked how that conclusion squares
with the obstruction of justice or similar criminal statutes.142 Does not
such lawyering just as surely interfere with the due administration of
justice as did the activities of Cintolo and Cueto? Indeed, is not such
interference (in at least some senses of that term) precisely what a candid
criminal-defense advocate would admit was uppermost on her mind?
The inescapable answer is that those concepts do not square at all, or
at least not without some fast verbal footwork involving a good bit of
winking and nodding, with at least the lay conception of obstruction of
justice. Any person other than a lawyer who knowingly attempted to
create a false impression about the guilt or innocence of an accused in the
course of the trial - such as by testifying or submitting into evidence a
document known to be false - would surely violate the criminal law.'4
Why then do lawyers, in one way (and not the best way) of putting the
question, get a pass on this body of criminal law when conducting a
criminal defense?
The answer has to do with the nature of the criminal process and at
least professional perception of the outer limits - but nonetheless
141 On the permissibility of such cross-examination, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at
§ 106 cmt. c (describing issue as "particularly difficulty" but suggesting that practice is
"legally permissible."). But see, e.g., Carl M. Selinger, The "Law" on Lawyer Efforts to
Discredit Tnhthfid Testimony, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1993) (disagreeing with position taken in
Restatement); Subin, Different Mission, supra note 137.
142 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of offense).
143 The point is graphically illustrated by the curious case of In re Schachne, 5 F. Supp. 680,
682 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). In that case, the court held that a lawyer who had been acting as
criminal defense attorney but then withdrew and took the stand as a sworn character
witness for the accused in the same proceeding was guilty of professional misconduct
where the evidence showed that the lawyer knew the accused client was in fact guilty of
the charged offense. Schachne, 5 F. Supp. at 682.
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accepted limits - of a lawyer's proper role within that process. At
bottom, the privilege extended to a criminal defense lawyer to treat
white as black, and black as white is based on two concepts. The first is
the importance - always as a matter of democratic theory and at least
sometimes as a matter of vindicating the factual innocence of the accused
- of permitting a vigorous defense of every accused. As the lawyer
saying has it, we permit every criminal-defense lawyer in every criminal
defense to put the prosecution - the state - to its proof on every
proposition necessary to obtain a conviction.144 The second reason has to
do with the great practical difficulties of ascertaining the core fact of
what the lawyer "knew" about guilt and innocence, truth and falsity. 145
Those difficulties are chiefly two. The first is the ubiquitous problem in
the law of proving a state of mind - intent or purpose. Often, that
difficulty will be compounded by the potential for the seriously
distorting effect of "hindsight bias," 146  because defense-lawyer
prosecutions often come only after conviction of the accused client.' 47
The second problem is the necessity of invading what the law otherwise
treats as the confidential area of client-lawyer communications. 148 To be
sure, the crime-fraud exception 49  will probably strip away
confidentiality, and often the client will waive the privilege explicitly as
part of a plea bargain, as did attorney Cueto's client. In addition, since
no such trial could occur, with fairness to the accused lawyer, without
opening up part or all of the course of communication between defense
lawyer and accused, even if the client does not cooperate with the
prosecution or otherwise waive the privilege, the lawyer is entitled to
use client information to the extent reasonably necessary in her
144 An excellent article by John B. Mitchell refers to this as the process of making the screens
of the criminal law work. See John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-
New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1980).
145 This is not to say that it is meaningless to refer to a lawyer's knowledge, cf. supra note
106, but that a determination of that knowledge is, for practical reasons, often difficult to
make with confidence.
14 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L REV. 571, 571-93 (1998) (describing psychological phenomena of hindsight bias,
where observers' belief in such elements as causes of remembered events can be heavily
distorted by knowledge of subsequent outcomes).
147 In cases such as Cueto, where the former client has struck a deal with the prosecutor to
testify against the client's former lawyer, hindsight bias is further exacerbated by the jury's
awareness of the client's admission that his intent was itself unlawful.
148 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 60(1)(a) (stating general duty of a lawyer
regarding client confidentiality and not revealing client communications).
149 See generally id. at § 82.
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defense. 50 While the law, on balance, thus allows deep client secrets to
be spilled rather wholesale in the courtroom, we should hardly count
that as a unalloyed victory - certainly not for confidentiality values in
general.
Similar objections, of course, could be and have been made to the
deployment against lawyers of obstruction and similar criminal statutes,
with their heavy dependence on state-of-mind determinations. Yet, the
case is readily made that if lawyers were free to commit acts that would
otherwise constitute obstruction and similar offenses, the ensuing state
of affairs would wreak havoc with a fragile criminal-justice system. And
it is hardly trivial to urge that any alternative verbal formulation to
define criminally-prohibited acts in this area should reach broadly to
encompass all likely objectionable schemes of the criminally disposed.
Criticizing such statutes as the federal obstruction statute as obscurely
worded is easily done; it is much more difficult to formulate something
more precise with approximately the same reach.
Hence, we are left wishing for greater precision, but having little
hope of finding any in more skillfully crafted criminal statutes that are
broad enough to capture most socially destructive activity. We wish to
maintain the full vigor of traditional law practice, yet we are constrained
to admit that traditional lawyering can also sometimes tread over the
line into the criminal. And we must concede that much of the difference
turns on the disposition, the intent, the purpose of the lawyer - surely a
difficult concept to prove and a dangerous concept to permit to run loose
because of its potential for erroneous jury findings. To help - but surely
not to cure - the inherent ambiguity .of such a situation, I offer three
modest suggestions - one .structural, another procedural, and the third
substantive.
150 See id. at §§ 64, 83 (discussing the exception to the agency-law-based rule of
confidentiality, permitting a lawyer to reveal confidential client information in his or her
own self-defense, including in a situation in which a non-client brings an official
proceeding against the lawyer, and the corresponding "self-defense" exception to the
attorney-client privilege); see also Regina v. Murray, 48 O.R.3d 437 (Ontario 2000)
(discussing a similar rule in Canada, whereby lawyer-accused, charged with criminal
offense of obstructing justice by removal of videotapes from client's home and subsequent
retention, entitled to offer in evidence client communications otherwise protected under
solicitor-client privilege, even if client opposes such use).
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A. Structural Protections: Avoiding Retaliatory Prosecutions
The first, structural, suggestion is to reduce the risk of retaliatory
prosecutions. A particular danger involved in criminal prosecutions of
lawyers inheres in the strong legal tradition, and accompanying legal
doctrine, that discretion in prosecution - selecting offenses and
defendants to charge, and selecting the actual charges brought - resides
only in prosecutors. Hence, courts have steadfastly refused to take on
the task of assessing whether prosecutorial discretion was properly
exercised in all but extreme and obvious cases of corruption or bias.151
But, in a case involving prosecution of a criminal defense lawyer, that
could mean that the same lawyer-prosecutor who has prosecuted a
criminal charge against an accused who was vigorously defended by a
criminal-defense lawyer will then be the same person (or at least
colleagues within the same prosecutor's office) deciding whether to
prosecute the criminal-defense lawyer for crimes allegedly committed
during the course of the criminal defense. Such an exercise of discretion
could, without hope of effective judicial review, turn on entirely
inappropriate considerations, such as a desire to neutralize a particularly
successful criminal-defense lawyer who litigates vigorously, but
lawfully. Acting on an abiding personal animosity toward a particular
criminal-defense lawyer or such lawyers in general, even if clumsily
disguised, will pass judicial notice. Even most decisions by a prosecutor
to charge a lawyer for acts committed in the course of a successful
criminal defense involving the same prosecutor, while suspicious - and
151 Under existing law, courts will provide no scrutiny of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. In almost every instance in which an accused has attempted to argue that the
prosecutor has over-charged or selected a particular defendant for prosecution on
impermissible grounds, courts have resisted under broad holdings, leaving such decisions
to the discretion of the prosecutor. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408-415 (2001)
(reviewing decisions upholding questionable uses of prosecutorial discretion). Situations
exist in which courts will intervene, but they are exotic instances requiring proof of a
particularly objectionable criterion for choice, such as race-based or gender-based criteria,
in making the charging decision. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
(holding that defendant seeking discovery on defense of racially-discriminatory
prosecution must first produce credible evidence that government could have prosecuted
similarly situated defendants of other races, but failed to do so); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting attack on constitutionality of Georgia's death-penalty
administration, despite evidence of racial discrimination in administration); Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (holding that defendant alleging selective prosecution in
failure to register for draft has burden of proving both discriminatory impact and
discriminatory intent); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1%2) (holding that selective
prosecution violates federal Constitution only if race, religion or other arbitrary
classification motivates prosecution).
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possibly rankly so (as where the lawyer has frequently obtained
acquittals in prosecutions brought by that prosecutor) - will not rise to
the level of judicially reviewable exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
Plainly, there is need for structural protection. Within the federal
criminal justice system, such protection has recently been put in place,
but more should be installed. At the outset, it is important to note that it
is the case, and probably will remain so, that difficult or complex cases of
lawyer prosecution will predominantly involve federal prosecutors. 5 2 It
is thus somewhat welcome news that the Department of Justice recently
put in place the beginnings of a policy that has much to recommend it.
The regulation, which is part of the U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL, 5 3 requires
that written notice of a federal prosecution against a lawyer must be sent
to the assistant attorney general for criminal matters in Washington.
However, this reporting requirement only applies: first, when the
lawyer is prosecuted for an offense committed in the course of
representing a client; second, when the client of the lawyer is likely to
testify against the lawyer; and third, when the client's testimony will be
given pursuant to a non-prosecution, cooperation or similar agreement
with the government. It is, I think, not a serious criticism that the
requirement is solely one of reporting - rather than, for example, that the
assistant attorney general personally signs off on the indictment. A
conscientious assistant attorney general, alert to the importance of
oversight, will need nothing more than notice, while an inattentive
official would likely sign anything to keep the paper flowing. The first
restriction - implicitly omitting the reporting requirement for lawyer
prosecutions for non-practice offenses - is sensible. Indeed, it dovetails
exactly with the area in which concern about lawyer prosecution is most
acute.
152 That follows for many reasons, including the typically greater investigative and
organizational resources of federal prosecutors, the greater immunity of federal
prosecutors from local bar influences (which can severely dampen the enthusiasm of an
elected district attorney to conduct a prosecution that significant elements of the local bar
will find threatening), and the more-encompassing reach and judicially-tested nature of
relevant federal criminal statutes. Part, perhaps most, of the reason is the ongoing
federalization of much of criminal law in general. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261-76 (1993).
s3 The manual is taken seriously by federal prosecutors but by its own terms does not have
the force of a binding regulation. Hence, it is not enforceable in court against the United
States. See, e.g., Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 751-52 (D. Colo. 1996) (citing several
authorities, the court holds in prosecution of Oklahoma City bombing suspect, that
protocol to be followed in death penalty cases set out in manual did not create judicially
enforceable substantive or procedural rights).
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The remaining limitations, however, seem inapt and should be recast.
They seem to confuse our current problem with another, more vocal,
dispute - that over the extent to which prosecutors can make contact
with a person represented by counsel. 154 In situations of the kind
discussed in this Lecture, the risk of prosecution based on inappropriate
assessment could be equally great regardless of the kind of
arrangements, or even the absence of arrangements, between prosecutor
and client. A wiser policy would extend the requirement of reporting to
all instances in which a United States attorney proposes to indict any
lawyer for a crime committed in the course of representing a client. The
factors relating to whether the client will testify and, if so, under what
kind of plea agreement, are irrelevant and should be dropped as limiting
conditions.
Can this sort of supervisory limitation on overly-aggressive
prosecution of lawyers be duplicated in the states? The problems here
are more complex. They arise out of the strong tradition, if -not state
constitutional arrangement, under which prosecutorial discretion is in no
sense centralized. In New York, for example, local district attorneys of
the state's eighty-seven counties function as little lords in their
impregnable fiefdoms. There is no state-wide authority that has either
visitorial or, certainly, supervisory authority over them.155 How, if at all,
that could be overcome for our modest purposes must lie beyond the
1-4 The literature on the subject is extensive. See, e.g., Sapna K. Khattwala, Note, Toward
Uniform Application of the "No-Contact" Rule: McDade is the Solution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
111 (1999) (favorably analyzing effects of federal legislation requiring federal prosecutors
to abide by state rules limiting contact with suspects represented by counsel); John H. Lir,
Note, The Side Effects of a Legal Ethics Panacea: Revealing a United States' Standing Committee's
Proposal to "Standardize" Ethics Rules in the Federal Courts as an Attempt to Undermine the No-
Contact Rule, 13 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 547 (2000) (urging rejection of proposal of a committee
of the United States Judicial Conference to standardize ethics rules in all federal courts as
subterfuge to allow federal prosecutors to ignore state anti-contact rules); see also Roger C.
Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the
Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L REV. 291 (1992); William J. Stunz, Lawyers,
Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L REv. 1903 (1993). The issues were also surveyed
in a quite recent Tabor Lecture. See Susan R. Martyn, Are We Moving in the Right Direction?
Sadducees, Two Kingdoms, Lawyers, and the Revised Model Rule of Professional Conduct, 34 VAL.
U. L. REV. 121, 164-68 (1999) (discussing efforts of ABA Ethics 2000 commission to reach
consensus on proposed revisions to ABA Model Rule 4.2 and noting that the anti-contact
rule "has devoured a greater number of hours in [deliberations of ABA's commission]
Ethics 2000 than any other").
155 The New York Court of Appeals has recently held that the state's governor is
empowered to appoint the attorney general to conduct a prosecution in individual cases. In
re Johnson, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997). But it would be extremely unlikely that the
governor would do so in each case of a prosecution of a lawyer for a practice-related
offense.
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scope of this study. The problem would obviously require separate
address in each state. One possibility would be statewide legislation
requiring notice to a state office - say, the state attorney general and the
state bar - of any prosecution of a lawyer for practice-related crimes.
Such notice would enable those other agencies to review the prosecution
and make their own determinations concerning whether the prosecution
is warranted and, if not, to intervene in a procedurally appropriate way.
B. Procedural Protections: Expert Testimony and Court Instructions
Once a prosecution is commenced, there are at least two areas in
which judges, under existing law, can contribute to the desirable effort of
seeing that no innocent lawyer is found guilty of alleged practice-related
crimes. One of the chief difficulties in enforcing a criminal statute
against lawyers, such as the federal obstruction statute, is that everything
turns on intent and context. The jury's task will be difficult because of
the inescapably elusive nature of the elements of intent.156 Moreover, the
jury's ability to understand and assess will either be extremely limited or
perhaps distorted by individual jurors' prior life experiences.157 It seems
particularly apt then, that courts allow testimony - properly limitedse -
that will allow the jury to hear discussion (and perhaps expert
disagreement) about the proper role and activities of lawyers.159 For
16 That is true in all such prosecutions other than those where the lawyer-defendant
attempts to put forward a counter-productive story consisting of suspiciously self-serving
denials or where there is clear documentary or other physical evidence. As Cintolo
illustrates, even prosecutions of lawyers based on strong evidence (there contemporaneous,
secret tape recordings) did not prevent what the jury evidently concluded was an elaborate
and false lawyer tale of an innocent state of mind. See snpra notes 79-83 and accompanying
text.
15 Exposure to the portrayal of lawyers in the media very likely will have left at least some
jurors with erroneous ideas about traditional law practice. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Bad
Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 533 (2000) (survey of 284 films indicates that in 1930-
70 films, two-thirds of lawyer portrayals were affirmative, but films since then are highly
negative); Michael Asimow, V/hen Lawyers Were Heroes, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1996)
("Just as the old movies unrealistically painted lawyers in glowing terms, the current ones
are too negative. Yet they accurately reflect and no doubt reinforce the popular culture in
which attorneys have about the same public approval rating as the criminals they
represent."). Lawyers also commonly regard their own portrayals by the media and in
popular culture as unfairly negative. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, Dressed for Excess: How
Hollywood Affects the Professional Behavior of Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 49 (2000).
Is One clearly sensible limitation would be to rule inadmissible any attempt by an expert
witness to testify to an "opinion" about the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused
lawyer.
151 As mentioned, I have a financial conflict in making observations about admitting such
expert testimony, because of my own role as occasional expert witness in criminal
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example, in United States v. Kellington,16 the Ninth Circuit held that a
trial court had properly granted a new trial on behalf of a lawyer-
defendant because of the trial court's error in excluding expert testimony
relating to the alleged dilemma facing the lawyer. Other decisions are
generally in accord.1 61 Thus, the law needs no development here, at least
in the federal courts, but it would be well to underscore its potential
importance.
Another well-established device is jury instructions. As several
judges have done in prosecutions of lawyers for practice-related crimes,
it is certainly fitting for the presiding judge to lend his or her weight of
authority, through instructions to the jury, to such established and
professionally accepted factors as the lawyer's primary duty to the client,
duties of confidentiality and loyalty, and similar general considerations.
In short, here too the weight of judicial approval should be placed on
concepts of traditional lawyering in good faith.162 Such instructions
would go far to remove concerns that lay jurors in criminal cases,
unacquainted with the occasionally counter-intuitive but accepted roles
of lawyers, might mistake good faith traditional lawyering for criminal
conduct.
prosecutions of lawyers. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the law on
the admissibility of expert testimony in lawyer prosecutions is fairly well-settled.
160 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 949 (11th Cir. 2001), rev'g 97 F. Supp. 2d
1084 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (holding that defendant-lawyer is entitled to rebut the government's
case through expert testimony); United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299,1308-09 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that trial court erred in excluding testimony of lawyer-expert witness about
ethical constraints under which lawyers practice, as well as about "the substance of rental
asset transaction" as to which lawyer provided legal services); State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d
1355, 1360-63 (Utah 1993) (stating testimony by lawyer-expert admissible on question of
factual elements of question of materiality of information not disclosed to investors). See
generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Admissibility, in Prosecution of Attorney for
Collaborating with Client in Criminal Activities, of Evidence as to Attorneys' Duties Under Code of
Professional Responsibility, 111 A.L.R. FED. 403 (1993). On the broader question of the
admissibility of expert testimony by lawyers on their work, see generally Charles W.
Ehrhardt, The Conflict Concerning Expert Witnesses and Legal Conclusions, 92 W. VA. L. REV.
645 (1990); Carl M. Selinger, The Problematic Role of the Legal Ethics Expert Witness, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 405 (2000).
162 Not all lawyer-defendants would, of course, be entitled to such an instruction. If, for
example, there was no evidence of good faith in the record, an instruction assuming the
lawyer's good faith would not be appropriate. See, e.g., Durie v. Florida, 751 So. 2d 685,690
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no error for trial court to refuse to instruct that lawyer
acting in good faith in honest belief that advice is well-founded is not criminally
answerable for mere error in judgment, where no evidence that lawyer had good faith
belief in client's entitlement to funds involved in grand theft prosecution of lawyer).
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C. Substantive Protection: Extension of the Federal Witness-Tampering
Proviso
Finally, Congress has already partially provided what should be
another generalized substantive protection for all lawyers prosecuted for
practice-related crimes. A subsection of the federal witness-tampering
statute provides that the tampering crime "does not prohibit or punish
the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in
connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding." 163 The latter
element, describing the types of proceedings within the section, simply
repeats the substantive element of tampering, and is not generalizable to
other offenses.
The first portion of the proviso (excepting from the definition of the
offense "the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation") was
added in 1986. At least one recent, major decision' 64 has held that the
statute requires that, once the accused lawyer has pleaded the subsection
as an affirmative defense and satisfied the minimal burden of showing
that the accused was a licensed lawyer who was retained by a client to
perform the legal representation that constituted the charged conduct,
the government bears both the burden of proof and the burden of
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut the affirmative showing
in demonstrating the improper purpose of the accused.165 Thus, what
might have been conceived of as (only) a defendant-lawyer's explanation
becomes a principal part of the government's case. That will occur so
long as (and only after) the lawyer-accused pleads and minimally proves
M~ 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (1994 and Supp. 2000) (added by Criminal Law and Procedure
Technical Amendments Act (1986)).
16 Kloess, 251 F.3d at 941 (dismissing indictment for failure to allege non-application of §
1515(c) in case of prosecution of lawyer for obstructing communication to judge of
information regarding commission of criminal offense). Another factor, not mentioned by
the court in Koess, strongly supports its analysis and result. Accepting the argument of the
government that the burden of pleading and proof of the Section 1515(c) defense was on
the accused would have forced many lawyer-defendants onto the witness stand, creating
the need for extensive and probably intricate judicial management to limit cross-
examination to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege of the accused.
165 Id. ("A defendant-lawyer seeking the safe harbor of Section 1515(c) must affirmatively
show that he is entitled to its protection .... This is a minimal burden. Evidence tending to
show that the defendant is a licensed attorney who was validly retained to perform the
legal representation which constitutes the charged conduct is sufficient to raise an inference
of innocent purpose. Any requirement to do more would unconstitutionally shift the
burden to the defendant to prove his innocence by negating an element of the statute - the
required mens rea. This the Constitution forbids.") (citations and footnote omitted).
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the defense (or the government concedes the minimal showing).166 That
will have any number of felicitous effects, including confronting the
prosecutor at the outset with the implicit congressional judgment that
"lawful, bona fide, legal representation" is above and beyond the
condemnation of the criminal law. The argument is considerably
circular - being based in large part on the requirement that the legal
representation be "lawful," but the point is nonetheless worthwhile. I
should also point out that the law is still very much in a state of
development under the witness-tampering statute, and we have yet to
hear from other federal courts of appeals and, possibly, the Supreme
Court on the interpretation of the subsection. For what it is worth, the
interpretation discussed here seems eminently sound to me.
Indeed, why should not Congress generalize that concept into a free-
standing Section of Title 18 of the United States Code that would apply
to all offenses charged against a lawyer? The idea would be to write the
new, generalized statute in a way that clearly requires in every
prosecution of a lawyer that the government prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the same proposition now required only in witness-tampering
prosecutions. Once the accused-lawyer raised and minimally proved the
foundation for the defense, the government would always bear the
burden of proving that the lawyer's conduct did not constitute the
provision of "lawful, bona fide, legal representation services" to a client.
Both the theory and the facts of the cases we have examined in which
convictions of lawyers have been upheld would support such a
limitation. Moreover, the decided cases suggest that the government
would face no difficult burden in doing so. The defense would not be
overbroad, because a lawyer charged with a non-representation offense
(e.g., tax evasion by non-payment of the lawyer's own taxes) would be
unable to make the minimal showing, and thus, no additional burden
would be shifted to the prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
Truth be told, we lawyers are filled with deeply contradictory
thoughts about the criminal law. Civilized social life without it is not
imaginable. Lawyers can often be found at the forefront of public
campaigns to improve and enhance criminal law enforcement. Indeed,
'6 In Kloess, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant-lawyer's burdens of
pleading and proof were anticipated and thus met by the indictment itself, which alleged,
first, that the accused was a licensed lawyer, and second, that he had been retained to
provide the representation which consisted of the charged offense. Id. at 948 n.8.
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no utopian scheme that I am aware of dares to dispense with it.
Libertarians of almost all stripes concede, if with reluctance, that some
such system is vital even in a minimal state. On the other hand, we have
darker thoughts. Those of us who do not practice in the field (and, I
suspect, some of us who do) are troubled by the operation of the
criminal-justice system, as is the vast majority of non-lawyers. 167 There
are several reasons for this. Most obviously, there are important reasons
to be concerned that our criminal justice system does not work well.1'
Thus, we may fear that lawyer-defendants will fall into convictions, not
because they are guilty, but because they are the victims of a deeply-
defective system. But, lawyers have no claim for immunity from a
system that, with all its defects, is imposed on all others - including the
great masses of those who have no realistic share of blame for its
imperfections.
Then again, our unease about the criminal law might be less
articulately self-protective. Despite our ability to recount intellectually
the importance of criminal law prosecution and criminal law defense, the
world of crime and criminals is for many lawyers strongly repulsive.
Criminal courts, at least specialized criminal courts in large cities, are
typically from somewhat to decidedly seedy, ruthless, hostile, and
worse. Lawyers who spend their professional lives dealing with crime
are able to tell exotic stories, but we view both prosecutors and, perhaps
more, defense lawyers with at least mild suspicion. With notable
exceptions, the lawyers who find their practice confined to criminal work
are often among the least respected of lawyers amongst their
professional peers,169 occasionally -- but hardly always - with reason. We
fear that this little-known world may be personally threatening and
sordid, such as portrayed for us in Tom Wolfe's criminal judicial hell in
modem urban life. 170
167 See, e.g., MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that "[i]t is probably accurate,
if controversial, to say that defense of persons accused of crime has led to more public
antipathy toward the legal profession than any other cause. Yet, of course, it is both
indispensable and honorable that lawyers continue in that and other difficult roles").
168 See, e.g., H. RICHARD UIVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN
AMERICA (1996).
169 See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR (1982) (hypothesizing the existence of two "hemispheres" of lawyers based on
empirical data - one dealing with wealthy and corporate clients, primarily in wealth-
maximizing lawyering; the other dealing with low- and middle-income individuals with
problems, e.g., criminal defense, which are functions of a legal system they cannot strongly
influence).
170 See TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).
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The idea that a brother or sister lawyer might become entangled in
that ambiguous realm of harsh and threatening justice gives us pause.
Some of us will even admit to feelings that the criminal law is not for the
likes of us lawyers! It is for.., who?... well, people different from us -
bad people. But of course it is not, at least it is not exclusively for the
strangers among us, either (certainly) under widely-accepted political
theories of justice or (to a less-confident degree) in actual practice.
Lawyers must and will be prosecuted for crimes, including crimes
committed on behalf of clients in the course of law practice. At least
some of those criminal charges will involve the very difficult and
troubling situations that we have considered here - those in which the
lawyer's guilt is highly fact-specific. Perhaps worse, for some offenses
critical evidence will rest entirely on proof that the lawyer performed an
otherwise entirely lawful legal service for a client but for a criminally
wrongful purpose. With the procedural protections now in place and
with enhanced administrative arrangements of the sort that I have
urged, I believe that criminal justice for lawyers is at least as attainable as
it is for other citizens.
More than that, lawyers - in justice - cannot ask. Beyond this, we
lawyers must proceed as clients often must: with both good faith and a
wise attention to the sometimes clumsy demands of law. The law, as it
often is for clients in their very important activities, will sometimes be
unknowable with certainty. To that extent, as with clients, a lawyer will
suffer the qualms of doubt inflicted by the human institution of law.
There is no plausible alternative, painful as the doubts may be. And
undoubtedly, a wise lawyer will stop short of discernible limits and
refuse to enter, on behalf of a client, areas of doubtful legality, even if the
lawyer is convinced that the law "should" not disallow the contemplated
activity. Justice and prudence are not at war.
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